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JOSÉ INGENIEROS (1877-1925)

ARTURO TORRES-RIOSECO

University of Texas

José Ingenieros, the greatest representative of Argentine and Spanish-American thought, died a few weeks ago in Buenos Aires. Early in 1925 he had gone to Paris at the special invitation of the French Government to attend the one hundredth anniversary of Charcot's birth, and there both men of science and writers paid a just homage to his genius. With his death America loses one of those men who appear at long intervals in the history of young nations, and who are, by the loftiness of their thought and by the force of their ideals, the strongest pillars of society. After the death of José Enrique Rodó there remained no other writer who understood so well the duties of a democratic intellectual as did Ingenieros. His works are very little known in the United States, in spite of the fact that one of his most famous essays is devoted to the study of the life, the doctrines, and the social influence of Emerson. In the present article I shall endeavor to give a brief resumé of his life and his work.

Ingenieros was born in April, 1877. He studied in the University of Buenos Aires and received his degree of Doctor of Medicine from that institution in 1899. Two years before his graduation he had begun his literary career,

associating his name with those of Ricardo Rojas and Leopoldo Lugones. In 1898, when Argentina and Chile almost came to a war on account of their boundary dispute, Ingenieros published a daring book called *La Mentira Patriótica* (The Patriotic Lie), in which he advocated ideals of international peace and progress. By this time he had expressed in various essays his views on labor problems, which demonstrated that his sympathies lay entirely with the socialistic party of his country. After 1899 he devoted himself to the study of sociology, pathology, and psychiatry. He founded in 1902 the "Archives of Psychiatry and Criminology." He was appointed Professor of Nervous Diseases of the University of Buenos Aires in 1902. In 1904 he became Professor of Experimental Psychology in the same university. In 1905 he represented the Argentine Republic in the Fifth International Congress of Psychology and served as the president of one of its sections. In 1906 he gave lectures in some of the most important universities of Europe. In 1907 he founded the Institute of Criminology in Buenos Aires. In 1915 he founded the *Revista de Filosofía*. In 1916 he represented his country in the Scientific Congress in Washington. In 1918 he became Professor of Philosophy in the University of Buenos Aires. In 1925 he delivered important lectures in Paris at the invitation of the *Sociétés des Savants*. Ingenieros was honorary member of several European universities, honorary member of the principal scientific societies of Europe and Spanish America, and contributor to a great number of learned reviews.

Ingenieros published in his youth works on literature, criticism, and travel. Afterwards he wrote a few books on medicine, among which the most important are *Histeria y Sugestión*, *Criminalología*, *Simulación de la Locura*. Later he began his sociological essays and gave to the press *Sociología Argentina*, *El Hombre Mediocre*, *Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas*. In the field of philosophy he has left numerous original contributions, *Principios de Psicología*,

Hacia una Moral sin Dogmas, Propositiones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía, and a book on Emile Boutroux.

Ingenieros affords an excellent example of mental and moral eminence. He was not satisfied to be solely a man of science, a mere professor of the University of Buenos Aires; he aspired rather to be an intellectual guide of the present generation of Spanish-American thinkers. He studied and passed opinion on every problem of importance. He subjected to critical and sympathetic consideration every new system of ideas. After the European war he attacked the capitalism of the modern countries and proclaimed the superiority of the Soviet régime. In his book, *La Reforma Educacional en Rusia*, he studied the revolutionary reforms of the Russian, Lunatcharski, Minister of Education in the Soviet Republic. Two years ago, at a banquet given by the Argentine writers in honor of José Vasconcelos, the Mexican educator, Ingenieros delivered a memorable speech against the so-called North American imperialism. He said among other things: "To the Pan-American Movement, exceedingly dangerous to our republics, we must oppose a Latin American Union; this Union would tend to strengthen the bonds of friendship among Spanish-American nations and to combat the influence of North American capitalism which threatens the independence of our continent; our governments tied, through their debts, to the carriage of North American imperialism, are a danger to us. We already know the phrase, the flag follows trade." On June 29, 1925, in Paris, at a great demonstration by Latin American Republics against this North American imperialism, Ingenieros declared that he had been mistaken during the war in his support and admiration of the United States, that his new position was one of opposition to the United States and in defense of the territorial integrity of Spanish America. In this memorable address he expressed the belief that the salvation of societies depends on the attitude of the men who are not yet thirty years of age, and that old men are entirely useless in the development of civilization. No wonder that a man who

talked and acted as Ingenieros did made the greatest appeal to our youth. As an evidence of the strength of his appeal, the Latin American Union is today a definite organization with central office in Buenos Aires, and there are similar associations in all the South American capitals in process of formation.

I will not deal in this article with his literary works, nor will I endeavour to analyze his books on medicine. It is outside of these two subjects that we find the most important contributions of this author to contemporary Spanish-American culture. In *Sociología Argentina* he studies the formation of the Argentine Republic and her position in the American continent. Prophetic of her future greatness are the concluding remarks of one of the most interesting chapters: "The most powerful nation of South America will be that which is favoured by four natural factors: territorial extension, climate, wealth, and race. Chile is a small country and has no natural resources; Brazil has a poor climate and no definite race; Argentina is the only country which unites these four factors: a large territory, fertile soil, temperate climate, and white race. This superiority of the Argentine Republic will enable her to become in the near future a leader of the Neo-Latin nations of our continent." *Sociología Argentina* is the most serious attempt yet made¹ to study the social phenomena of that flourishing nation from a scientific point of view by the application of biological laws to the development of social psychology and social economy.

*El Hombre Mediocre*² is one of the very few books by Spanish-American authors which every intellectual person ought to know. We South Americans have produced an enormous quantity of lyric poetry, as well as short stories and novels, but up to 1900 the essay was limited to the shallow political speech and to dry dissertations on historical

¹The works of Sarmiento, Alberdi, Echeverría, Ramos Mejía, and Quezada are of but fragmentary importance in the study of sociology.

²The Mediocre Man.

problems. In the production of this type of essay, however, we have been prolific. Such a small country as Chile, for example, has produced in the hundred years of her independent life more historians than Spain in a thousand. Our lyrical exuberance is likewise proverbial. It has been said that we talk in verse and that the only means of expression of our people is the stanza. At any rate, some of the greatest poets of the Spanish language have not been born in the Iberian Peninsula. Superabundance of poetry, however, usually reveals a lamentable superficiality of thought. I do not mean to say that poetry is not essential in the development of culture; on the contrary, I believe that men like Edgar Allan Poe or Shelley, for example, represent the highest intellectual achievement of the Anglo-Saxon race in modern times; but when poetry becomes a mania of all social classes it degenerates into clownish imitation. During the first years of this century there was a steady reaction in South America against the mere literary. Two books—masterpieces of their kind—show this tendency: *Ariel*, by José Enrique Rodó, and *El Hombre Mediocre*.

Ariel may become one of the most useful or one of the most dangerous books of our incipient culture. It contains a program of absolute idealism. It has come to be the breviary of Spanish-American youth. Rodó "reveals himself in *Ariel* that which he asks his youthful audience to become—a glowing idealist, mindful of the utilitarian element in life, yet considering it only the basis of a higher expansion."³ With this conception of life, Rodó opposed the North American idea of progress. He says in regard to the United States: "The will is the chisel that has sculptured this people out of solid rock. Its salient characteristics are two manifestations of the power of the will: originality and audacity. Its entire history is the manifestation of a virile activity. Its representative personage is named

³Goldberg, Isaac, *Studies in Spanish-American Literature*, New York, 1920, p. 195.

'I will,' like the superman of Nietzsche. If anything rescues it collectively from vulgarity, it is that extraordinary exemplification of energy. . . . The United States lives for the immediate reality, and through it subordinates all its activity to the egotism of personal and collective well-being. . . . North American religion is an auxiliary force of penal legislation which would abandon its past on the day when it would be possible to give to utilitarian morals that religious power which Stuart Mill was so desirous of endowing them with."⁴

Ariel has denied the value of industrial culture (shall we say of contemporary culture?) and has pointed out the necessity of amalgamating the Christian ideals of goodness and spirituality with the Greek ideals of beauty and joy. In addition, this book is the first effort to oppose every symptom of North American influence in South America. I may safely say that Rodó's *Ariel* has condemned the Pan-American Union to become an institution of diplomats with no possibility of ever gaining the sympathy of our intellectual leaders.

That *El Hombre Mediocre* is a similar book of pure idealism and moral altitude is evidenced by its central theme. Man should and must live for his ideal, for without ideals human evolution would be impossible; experience without imagination does not move; originality is never due to experience but to imagination; individual temperament produces definite ideals, and, accordingly, we must refuse the claim to a monopoly of ideals by those individuals who make it in the name of philosophical schools, systems of morals, religious beliefs, sectarian fanaticism or what-not; idealists are always enemies of mediocrity; the dreamers are opposed to utilitarians, the enthusiasts are opposed to apathy, the independents to conventionality, the intuitive to dogmatism. To the mediocre man, to be original is to be a heretic. The mediocre man would like to standardize his own mediocrity according to common sense. The idealist

⁴Goldberg, Isaac, *loc. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

is always dissatisfied; the mediocre always self-satisfied, indifferent. Common sense is plebeian, but good sense is a sign of refinement, of talent. The mediocre man, afraid of inequality, declares war on the saint, the genius, and the hero; he is the enemy of the ideal and of perfection. The millions who multiply around us and get rich are the common crowd of mediocrity; isolated they do not attract our attention; united they try to impose their plebeian standards on the best.

Ingenieros does not believe in the idea of a leveling democracy as it exists today, but rather in the supremacy of selected minorities of thinkers and men of great personal worth. Naturally, a book of this kind causes a great sensation, since every page of it carries a revolutionary idea, that is to say, an expression of facts and opinions which do not agree with contemporary ways of thinking. *El Hombre Mediocre* is a very useful book which every man, no matter what his intellectual activity be, should read. No doubt many readers will be discouraged by its ruthless vivisection of character and brutal sincerity of facts, because in every one of us there is something of the mediocre man; but for those who believe in infinite perfection, for those who are able to realize their shortcomings and their possibilities, this book should prove of great value.

Ingenieros' masterpiece is perhaps *Evolución de las Ideas Argentinas*.⁵ From the time of Sarmiento no author had evidenced such a complete knowledge of the Argentine soul. As historian, Ingenieros has presented in this volume one of the most accurate pictures of the history of his country; as sociologist he has explained the evolution of the Argentine mentality and arrived at daring conclusions, and as psychologist he has applied his experimental methods with relative exactitude.

In his book *Hacia una Moral sin Dogmas*,⁶ Ingenieros analyzes the work of Emerson; he shows himself to be well

⁵The Evolution of Argentine Ideas.

⁶Toward a Morality without Dogmas.

acquainted with the puritan atmosphere of New England, with the sermons and literary essays of Channing, with the life in Concord and with the pedagogical theories of Horace Mann. Previously the great Argentine educator, Sarmiento, had come to Boston and had studied the educational reforms of the North American professor. Sarmiento became one of the dearest friends of Mann, and later he introduced many of his reforms in the Argentine Republic. Ingenieros praises very highly Sarmiento's *Vida de Horacio Mann*.⁷ *Hacia una Moral sin Dogmas* is a treatise on ethics. At the outset Ingenieros declares himself against all dogmas "because to accept a dogma—as ignorant and lazy people usually do—is a denial of the possibility of infinite perfection." He considers that religious dogmas have fulfilled in certain epochs a real social function, but philosophical dogmas were never popular enough to have any influence on collective beliefs. As is quite evident, Ingenieros follows very closely the ideas of William James. For him sciences are absolutely impersonal; the application of scientific methods will not tolerate the enunciation of dogmas in the thought of the future, because dogmas handicap the development of our experiences and the natural formation of our ideals. For this reason the philosophies of the future will not be systems of demonstrated truths, but systems of hypotheses to explain those problems which are above actual experience, in harmony with the laws derived from particular sciences. All dogmas militate against truths. It would be absurd to conceive a scientific philosophy *ne varietur* like the theological and philosophical dogmas, since hypotheses and experiences follow the eternal laws of evolution. Hence, Ingenieros defines philosophy as "the metaphysics of experience." According to Ingenieros, from contemporary ethics we may derive four general conclusions independent of dogmas:

1. *Naturalism of morality*.—Moral experience develops

⁷The Life of Horace Mann.

in a natural manner as a result of the relations between the individual and society.

2. *Autonomy of morality.*—Moral experience is regulated neither by religious nor rational dogmas, and tends to emancipate itself from them in the future.

3. *Perfectibility of morality.*—Moral experience is limited neither by revelation nor reason; it perfects itself as social experience, tending to adapt itself to all social conditions.

4. *Sovereignty of morality.*—Life in society requires the acceptance of duty by the individual as a social obligation, and the collective fulfillment of justice as social sanction.

As a philosopher Ingenieros has left a very original essay: *Proposiciones Relativas al Porvenir de la Filosofía*. He was to read this at his reception as member of the *Academia de Filosofía y Letras* of the University of Buenos Aires, but his opinions about philosophy were so radical that the other members thought it best not to perform the public ceremony, and accordingly admitted Ingenieros into the academy without this requisite. In this book the Argentine professor studies the causes of the decadence of the Renaissance, of the philosophical crises of the nineteenth century and of the failure of metaphysics. He concludes that both scientific positivism and spiritualism, on account of their limited experiences, are to blame for this failure. He believes that a metaphysical renaissance may yet come, but it will be necessary that the problems and methods of metaphysics be revolutionized if positive results are expected. It will be indispensable to abandon all hypocrisies and conventional lies, to renovate contemporary philosophical language and to give a new orientation to all moral sciences in their relations with metaphysics.

As pointed out at the beginning of this article, Ingenieros has had an enormous influence on the new generations of Spanish-American men of letters. Because for many years we have taken ideas and methods from Europe, it is very difficult for a South American to be recognized as an original thinker. No doubt, we have had men of great

talent and even genius, such as Bello, Hostos, Montalvo, Rodó, and Rubén Darío, but I am sure Europeans would consider them as local writers, merely because they were born in small countries. Moreover, Spain has never been a country of philosophers, but of theologians. For these two reasons the influence of Ingenieros has been limited to our continent. And even within our own countries he has had to struggle with those who believe that real values must come from Europe. The case of Francisco García Calderón is a case in point. When García Calderón lived and wrote in Perú nobody thought much of him, but now that he has published several books in France, now that Poincaré, Boutroux, and Gaston Paris have taken cognizance of him, we recognize him as one of our representative men.

In concluding, it should be noted that much of Ingenieros' work is of popular nature. In this respect I believe that his influence may be compared with that of Max Nordau and Lombroso in Europe. Many of the articles published by Ingenieros in his *Revista de Filosofía* have been reproduced in Spanish newspapers and commented on in both America and Spain. Ingenieros has appealed greatly to the younger people because of his rebellious attitude in regard to conventional beliefs and accepted facts. He was an iconoclast but at the same time he had a constructive mind. He was original and he expressed his ideas in rich and rotund style; he gave himself up entirely to the study of modern problems and he sacrificed his life for knowledge and truth; he was, in short, the greatest personality of modern Argentina.

AMERICAN COTTON IN WORLD AFFAIRS

ALONZO BETTIS COX

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The story of cotton is extremely interesting. A brief summary of its rise from obscurity is the best way to explain its present commanding position in international commerce. Neither the birthday nor the birthplace of cotton is known. The first records of it are found in the sacred literature of India, though it is supposed to be native also to China and South America. In India it was considered a sacred commodity; much mystery and mythology were associated with it. It is asserted, for example, that even a thousand years before Christ the Hindoo spinners and weavers made a cloth so fine as to have earned the poetic description of "the weft of the woven wind."

The story of cotton, free wool, "baumwolle," and the fame of calico, the cloth from Calcutta, had found their way into all the civilized countries even before the time of Christ. By the time of the crusades the Indian cotton calicoes and muslins had become common articles of commerce as far west as Venice.

At this juncture the crusades of Western Europe were organized to drive the heathen from the Holy Land. The would-be conquerors fell victims to the luxuries of the East, particularly the beautiful silk and cotton robes, rugs, and draperies. The new wants created by these new contacts were important factors in quickening the Renaissance and preparing the way for the industrial revolution.

When cotton got to England it found wool thoroughly entrenched. Edward III, often nicknamed the Wool Merchant, had imported the Flemish weavers, forbidden the exportation of raw wool, and started the conversion of England from a pastoral to an industrial country. To symbolize the importance to be attached to wool in the Kingdom, it was provided that the Lord High Chancellor should sit

upon a wool sack when he presided over the House of Lords. Thus for 300 years after the middle of the fourteenth century wool held undisputed sway in England. Toward the latter part of the seventeenth century, however, cotton and the beautiful cotton fabrics from India challenged the supremacy of wool in its greatest stronghold, and before the middle of the next century the proverbial wool sack was tied with a cotton string.

Events moved rapidly from this time. Cotton became the cornerstone of the industrial revolution which occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth century. It relocated the world's markets and channels of trade in the first half of the nineteenth century. It made possible the cotton kingdom in America, and so effectively tied slavery to it that it took a civil war to break the bands. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century there grew out of the ruins of the old cotton kingdom of the South with its romantic past another cotton kingdom with such an abundant supply of cheap cotton that the ramifications of its influence and the strength of its power were only appreciated after the development of the World War.

The stoppage of the exports of cotton from the South in 1861 precipitated a panic in Europe which rapidly developed into a cotton famine. It cost many fortunes, put millions of people on the charity of governments, and caused the starvation of thousands. That was in the days when cotton had but few uses, the most important of which was as a material for clothing. Today cotton has an entirely different significance due to the great number of new uses found for it. Shortly after the Civil War the South reorganized her agriculture on a free labor basis and found to the amazement of the rest of the world as well as the South herself, that she could grow more cotton with free labor than with slaves. From the time of this reorganization there followed almost a half century during which the world's markets were flooded with cheap cotton—cotton so cheap, in fact, as to keep the South impoverished, but which at the same time made possible and usually profitable the

making of numerous experiments to discover new uses for what was rapidly becoming the universal fiber. As a result cotton not only threaded its way into the vital parts of most of the principal industries then in existence, but it became the foundation for many new ones. Even in the face of the multiplied uses cotton was still "just cotton" when the late war broke out. However, the war was not many moons old when it was realized that cotton in its multiplied uses supplied the very sinews of war. The old requirements of cotton for clothing, tents, and similar war-time uses were there in multiplied numbers, but along with them a host of others. It was the key to the ordnance department. In 1915 Sir William Ramsey computed that the British army required 1,000 bales of cotton per day to supply ammunition for its rifles, machine guns, and other light arms, or approximately 400,000 bales per year. He also estimated that one of their warships manned with twelve-inch guns consumed the equivalent of twelve bales of cotton per minute while in action. A good part of the army moved on cotton, especially when it wished to move rapidly. The automobile and the motorcycle would have been next to useless without cotton. The amount of cotton and cotton goods required on the field to save lives and nurse soldiers back to health was measured in thousands of bales. It is both unnecessary and impossible to give a catalogue of the hundreds of wartime uses for which cotton was indispensable.

The new and more significant role cotton was playing in the affairs of the world was first appreciated by England. She upset international customs and law and made cotton contraband of war. Her control over cotton by means of this action was the big factor in forcing Italy into the conflict on the side of the allies, and in ultimately winning the war.

In the language of the street, "Cotton has arrived," and threatens to play a spectacular and autocratic role.

THE WORLD'S SUPPLY

With cotton holding the extremely important position in the world that it does, it is no wonder that many nations, especially the industrial nations of Europe, are greatly concerned with the problems of increasing and broadening the world's supplies of it. Even before the war closed several of the European nations had plans underway to increase the world's supply of cotton and especially to render themselves less dependent upon America. The short crops of 1921-22-23 put European countries almost in a state of panic. They became convinced that America could never grow another large crop. For the most part they believe the one which has just been grown was the result of a happy combination of circumstances which will probably not appear again for a decade. They are not slackening in the least, therefore, their program of developing an independent source of cotton supply. Many say that America's consumption will ere long require her total crop and that when a short crop does come she will actually prohibit the export of cotton in order to supply her own mills.

What then is the situation with regard to the world's cotton supply? The United States grows approximately 60 per cent of the world's crop. That percentage does not measure the South's importance as a producer of cotton. Approximately 25 per cent of the world's cotton production has a fiber too short for most purposes of manufacture. It so happens that the second and third largest crops of the world, the Indian and the Chinese, are made up of this short cotton. Its uselessness for most European mills is well illustrated by the following story: It is said that during the cotton panic which resulted from the American Civil War, the people in Lancashire, England, the greatest cotton manufacturing center of the world, often met publicly to pray for cotton to relieve the suffering of the poor. Matters became so serious that the English Government, through the East India Company, sent over several thousand bales of the variety of Indian cotton known as *Surat*

for use in the English mills. Some time after this cotton had been delivered to the factories the people found themselves again assembled to pray for relief and more cotton. When the minister wound up his prayer as was his custom, by asking the Lord to send more cotton, one of the spinners who had been forced to work with the Indian cotton added, "Yes, Lord, more cotton, but deliver us from *Surats*."

Since that day England has spent much money, and is still spending it, to improve the quality of the Indian crop to make it competitive with that of the South. She has made some progress, but it has been extremely slow. According to the Department of Agriculture, the Indian crop for 1924-25 was the equivalent in weight of approximately 5,000 American bales, and of this total it is estimated that not more than one and one-half million pounds had a staple length of as much as seven-eighths inches.

The other 15 per cent of the world's cotton is known as staple cotton; it is cotton with a fiber length of one and one-eighth inches or more. The greater part of this cotton is grown in Egypt and the Mississippi delta. There is not very much of it when compared with the large volume of American upland cotton, which weaves from seven-eighths to one and one-eighth inches. Therefore it does not compete seriously with the bulk of our crop.

It is significant to note that, whereas we grow only about 60 per cent of the world's cotton crop, Europe as a whole depends upon the United States for approximately 70 per cent of her raw cotton, and some European countries rely on us for even a greater portion of their supply.

To them the situation is all the more serious because of the very rapid increase of consumption in the United States. They point out that 100 years ago we exported approximately 85 per cent of our production. From 1896 to 1900 the average exports were 68 per cent of the crop; the average from 1910 to 1914 was 62 per cent, and from 1920 to 1924 the average exports from the United States had declined to approximately 55 per cent of the production. The European countries are inclined to take the historical point

of view; therefore, a contemplation of these figures is apt to make them panicky.

What is Europe, or the world for that matter, doing or planning to do about the cotton situation? Every country in the world which has the least opportunity is making an attempt to grow a part of its cotton supply so as to reduce its dependence on America, the one great source of supply. England, for example, is spending large sums of money through the British Cotton Growing Association and in other ways to promote cotton growing in the Empire and elsewhere. In some cases the Government has subsidized the business by guaranteeing a minimum price. It likewise furnishes free of charge scientific information to all, and direct service in a great number of different projects. England encourages her nationals to organize cotton-growing corporations whenever her scientists tell her there is a possibility of making cotton growing profitable, and in the customary way she assures them that their interests will be properly protected.

In 1924 she faced a war with Egypt and a possible rupture with the League of Nations in order to build a dam across the Blue Nile in the Sudan and to convert thereby 300,000 acres of more or less desert land into a cotton field. Space will not permit and it is unnecessary to recount the number of projects the English have under way or are contemplating to increase the world's cotton supply. The size of these projects varies from the small ones in the islands such as Malta and the Fiji to vast irrigation projects in Africa, India, and Mesopotamia. It is calculated by the United States Department of Agriculture that when the irrigation projects underway in India are completed they will furnish thereby 12,000,000 acres of cotton land capable of producing cotton as good as the bulk of the American upland. India's acreage at the present time is approximately 26,000,000.

While England is more active than the other European countries, France, Italy, Belgium, and other European nations are spending large sums of money to break what they

term the American monopoly of "bread-and-butter" cotton. Far-away Japan seized Korea and is attempting to build a cotton empire of it. In 1924 her production was 17,000 bales, whereas in 1925 it was 120,000. This is not a bad showing.

There is a widespread feeling throughout Europe that she must have cheaper cotton. The statement is frequently made that no country whose women and children do not do the major portion of the work can grow cotton as cheaply as Europe requires. Many in England, for example, say that the bulk of her manufactures must be sold to the extremely poor peoples of India and China, and that in order for them to buy a sufficient amount to keep the English mills running they must have cheap goods.

Can all the countries interested, with all their projects, whether in Africa, India, Australia, South America, or elsewhere, wrest from the Southern States of the United States their position in the world of cotton production and force our farmers to compete on a woman and child labor basis? It is possible but extremely doubtful. They can and will increase the world's supply of cotton, but only gradually, and it is even questionable whether the added supply for which they may be responsible can keep pace with the ever-increasing demand.

The importance of competition which will come to the American cotton growers as a result of the determination on the part of Europe to have more and cheaper cotton should not be minimized. On the other hand, the South should be thoroughly alive to the situation. She should take stock of her resources and organize to meet the keenest sort of competition. It is generally conceded that as a whole she has the most highly skilled cotton growers in the world, that she has the most scientific advisers, that she has an experiment station system that is unexcelled, that she has the best large body of cotton-producing land, and the best marketing facilities in the world. If she cannot take these advantages and keep well ahead of the rest of the world she deserves to lose.

According to the Department of Agriculture, the United States had approximately 51 per cent of the world's cotton acreage during the five years prior to the war, whereas in 1924 she had 53 per cent. Of the total 8.7-million increase in acreage from the pre-war average to 1925, approximately 68 per cent was due to the increase in the United States.

The cotton production of the United States has shifted very decidedly to the West. In 1915 only 44 per cent of the acreage planted to cotton was west of the Mississippi River, whereas in 1924 the percentage was 64. In 1915 the acreage devoted to cotton in the United States totaled 31,500,000, in 1924 it had increased to 40,000,000, yet the acreage east of the river declined almost 3,000,000, whereas west of the river there was an acreage increase of approximately 12,000,000.

The records of the Department of Agriculture and the State experiment stations show that on an average the cost of production is much less in the western than in the eastern part of the cotton belt. This being true, it follows that relatively the tendency is towards lower costs of production and more efficient international competition.

DEMAND

The added supply resulting from the many projects of the European countries will come gradually and will often depend on the creation of a demand for cotton goods which in some instances may even more than absorb for a time the added production. For example, Nigeria, in West Africa, is one of England's best rainwater cotton-producing projects, one in which she is spending a great deal of money and effort. Last year the manager of the British Cotton Growing Association said they expected to grow a great deal of cotton there eventually. According to him, their chief difficulty is to get the 17,000,000 semi-civilized negroes to work. Labor in a cotton field is exacting, and before they can do much with the negroes they will have to increase their wants and thereby their demand for cotton clothing.

A thorough analysis of demand for cotton and cotton goods should be the basis of a production as well as a marketing program. The farmers have too often been content to grow cotton without seriously trying to find out where it went, what it was used for, and whether or not the product met the exact requirements of the spinner customers. If the South is to maintain her supremacy and increase her standard of living, she must pay more attention to this side of the business. Her chief asset lies in her intelligence, which will enable her to so order her production and marketing methods as to raise the premium on her products in the world markets.

The world's demand for cotton is measured in two ways: One of these, the one most frequently used, is mill consumption; the other is the final or per capita consumption of finished goods. The total measure of the ability of the world to consume in manufacturing is usually given as the number of spinning spindles. There are approximately 160,000,000 in the world. Europe has 63 per cent of these, the United States 24 per cent, and Asia, including India, Japan, and China, 11 per cent.

The number of spindles is a satisfactory measure of capacity to consume only when the different countries work the same hours and spin the same counts of yarn. Since all the countries do not have the same practice in these regards, a better measure of a nation's demand for raw cotton for manufacturing is the number of spindles multiplied by the per spindle consumption. Measured by this standard, Europe requires only 41 per cent of the world's supply of cotton, the United States 26 per cent, and Asia 27 per cent.

On the other hand, Europe's significance as a consumer of American cotton is more important than the 41 per cent would indicate. Approximately 70 per cent of the cotton consumed by Europe comes from the United States. Last year the United States exported 8,400,000 bales of the total 13,500,000-bale crop, and Europe took 87 per cent of the amount exported, or considerably over half of the entire crop.

The ability of the different countries of the world to manufacture cotton is not necessarily a measure of their capacity to consume goods made of cotton. Some of the European countries are really national middlemen in the great scheme of moving cotton from the fields to the ultimate consumers. To understand the world markets, therefore, it is perhaps more necessary to know the buying power of the ultimate consumers than to know the conditions in the middleman-manufacturing countries. England is the best example of a middleman-cotton-manufacturing country. She has approximately 60,000,000 spindles. She imports all her raw cotton and must find a market outside of England for three-fourths of her cotton manufactures. She sells some to every country in the world, but her two great markets are India and China. Before the war she sold to each of these countries approximately 4,000,000,000 yards of cotton cloth per annum. England's ability to keep her spindles going depends, therefore, on the buying power of her two chief customers. But England is not the only country interested in the buying power of India and China. The South sells to England over 70 per cent of her raw cotton, and almost all of that which is used to make the goods for the Indian and Chinese markets. In order, therefore, to have an intelligent idea of the demand for her cotton, the South must know the buying power of the Hindu on the plains of India and of the peasant farmer in central China.

Can it be done? Yes, accurately enough for ordinary practical purposes. It will be done before the passage of another decade. The researches being made by the United States Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and State are preparing the ground for it. In India, for example, a fairly accurate measure of what the people sell to get buying power has been found. In this case it happens that the products sold are largely agricultural, the volume of which is fairly indicated by the extent and intensity of the monsoon. The prices of India's important crops are determined in world markets. The buying power of other countries may be measured in a similar manner, and thus an index of world demand may be constructed.

In order to relate the national buying power of a country to a particular commodity, it is important to know the per capita or final consumption of that commodity. The per capita consumption of cotton goods in some of the typical countries of the world suggest the possible developments of this line of study. The per capita consumption in the United States in 1912-13 was 23.3 pounds, and in 1922-23 it was 25.9 pounds; in the United Kingdom it was 15.4 pounds in 1912-13, and 6.5 pounds in 1922-23, whereas in China it was 6.7 and 3.3 pounds respectively.

The United States, Canada, and one or two other countries are the only ones in the world which now have a per capita consumption of cotton goods greater than 1912-13. The per capita consumption of the near-billion people in Asia is little more than half what it was before the war. It would seem that the peoples outside of the United States and Canada are due for a rapid increase in their per capita consumption as they recover from the ravages of the late war. The strength of this reserve demand is showing itself this year. The world's production of cotton is perhaps the second largest in history, somewhere between 26,000,000 and 27,000,000 bales, yet the price holds well above the pre-war level, even when measured in terms of purchasing power.

The present demand, as has been pointed out, is based upon a great many more uses than it was even fifteen years ago. According to the best figures available for the United States, not over 50 per cent of the cotton consumed goes into clothing, 35 per cent goes into manufacturing industries such as automobiles and the milling trades, and 15 per cent into household furnishings such as towels and draperies.

With account taken both of the supply and of the demand, one is forced to the conclusion that the South will find much more profit in cotton growing during the years to come than she did in the forty years preceding the war.

THE WORLD'S COMMERCE IN COTTON

After thus describing briefly the rise of cotton in the world of affairs and analyzing the supply and demand, one

needs only to give a sketch of the broader national and international problems related to commerce in cotton to complete the picture. Space will permit a description of only two important movements which are related particularly to the American crop.

The trend toward more direct participation of governments in both domestic and foreign commerce has been going on for more than a generation, but the war and the events growing out of it have given the movement a vastly increased significance. The outstanding examples of the extent to which governmental participation is proceeding are afforded by the coffee valorization scheme of Brazil, the nitrate monopoly of Chili, and the English control of rubber. There is every reason to believe that this type of governmental participation is in its infancy. On more than one occasion high officials of the United States Government have hinted that they would favor the Government embarking on such a policy as the most effective means of reprisal. It is generally believed that the most serviceable commodity available for use in such a fight is cotton. The Secretary of Commerce, in discussing the problem last fall, named cotton as one of the commodities the sale of which the Government could control, and suggested that something would be done if other countries did not stop the practice of either encouraging or organizing officially-controlled monopolies. In spite of any such veiled threats the practice is doubtless here to stay, and it may be expected to develop on a much more comprehensive scale as each nation takes stock of its resources. The South is extremely interested in any such policy and should certainly prepare for the leadership necessary to take care of her interests whenever there is a possibility that such a program may be undertaken. At the present time, if such a policy were inaugurated, it is almost certain she would suffer. Indeed, the unfortunate thing about the present situation is that she is being made to suffer because of the threats of such a policy. The interested parties all over Europe, and especially in England, use the Secretary's statements to get

money and otherwise promote cotton growing in their different projects to compete with the South. To the extent that such statements do stimulate the efforts at cotton growing, they do the cotton growers an injustice.

It must not be forgotten that whereas Europe is dependent on us for some 70 per cent of her raw cotton that we are likewise dependent on Europe to take more than half of our production. Europe's importance as a market for America's cotton was demonstrated in 1914 when the price dropped from 12½ cents to 6 cents with Europe's withdrawal from the market. Again in 1920 the price fell from 40 cents to 15 cents, largely because of the weak buying power of people outside the United States. The South, therefore, is interested in keeping the channels of trade as free from obstruction as is possible.

The participation of our Government in the domestic trade in cotton has long passed the threat stage. In order to illustrate the length to which the Government has gone in regulating the domestic commerce in cotton, one needs to mention the Cotton Futures Act and the Cotton Standards Act. The Cotton Futures Act was passed in 1914 primarily to regulate the trading in contracts for future delivery, but in order to accomplish the desired purposes it was necessary to do many other things. It was necessary, for example, to have official cotton standards upon which to base the contract; to have an official price quotation service upon which to base the differences used in settlement, and to have a board of cotton classers to class the cotton offered for settlement of futures contracts. This law with all its ramifications has not proven offensive, and it is doubtful if there is more than one man out of a hundred engaged in the cotton trade who would like to see it repealed.

The Cotton Standards Act was passed only in 1923. It is far more sweeping in its provisions than the Futures Act. Indeed, it is almost world legislation. It provides among other things that cotton sold anywhere in the world by a citizen of the United States must be described in terms

of the official standards of the United States, if any standard is used. It provides for a system of licensing cotton classers whose statement of the class of the cotton becomes *prima facie* evidence in the courts as to the true classification of cotton. In some respects this Act has revolutionized trading in American cotton. For a time it threatened to disrupt world's trade, and was the big factor in forcing the adoption of the Universal Standards for American cotton. In order to administer the law the Secretary of Agriculture has been compelled to make certain agreements with foreign exchanges which are entirely new in international trade. For example, the Appeal Boards in Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, and Milan are appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture as officials of the Department of Agriculture to class cotton under the Cotton Standards Act, and it is understood that the classifications they give will be *prima facie* evidence in American courts. At first this law was severely condemned in the South, but even now if it were put to a vote among the Southern merchants it would doubtless be enacted by a large majority. As a rule, the leading merchants in the foreign markets who were inclined to think of it first as little short of piracy, are becoming convinced that the results accomplished are for the best interests of all.

Probably the most interesting aspect of world commerce in cotton is the increased importance of the people and institutions of the United States in handling the American crop. In 1914 it was generally conceded that England was supreme in the cotton world and that Liverpool was the greatest market in the world. The English were the great cotton merchants. The five big English banks financed most of the international trade in cotton. The most nearly universal standards for American cotton were the Liverpool standards. The Liverpool futures market was the international hedge market. The year 1926 finds most of these conditions changed. America's cotton merchants operate on a larger scale than do those of any other country. They

sell cotton in every important market in the world. American banks are doing much of the financing of international trade in cotton. The official cotton standards of the United States in 1923 became, with a few modifications, the universal standards. The New York futures market is the price-making center in the world of cotton and is the international hedge market. Cotton is sold in *cents per pound* in every European country except England.

There is one other significant change in commerce in American cotton which needs to be mentioned. In 1920 the cotton farmers of the South sold their cotton to the local merchant, banker, or speculator, often without knowing its quality or its real value. The unprofitableness of that crop stimulated the organization of cotton coöperative marketing associations based on a binding contract. At the present time there are thirteen of these associations in the South, one in each important cotton growing State, and they boast a membership of approximately 300,000 farmers who have signed what they term an ironclad contract, in which they agree to deliver all of their cotton to the association to be sold by it in any way and manner it sees fit. The association on its part agrees to deliver the proceeds of such sale or sales to the farmer on the basis of the amount and quality of the cotton he delivers. The latest information available indicates that these associations will market considerably over a million bales of the 1925 cotton crop. These associations have made some mistakes and have in some instances had comparatively high costs of operation, but if one will consider the fact that they have built this enormous business within four years it must be admitted that they have done remarkably well. These associations have championed the movements looking toward the improvement of the condition of the southern farmers. They have been the chief factor in promoting the production of a better quality of cotton, a more efficient system of production, and in general a better organized agriculture. This movement is even now an important factor in making the Southern cotton grower a more efficient competitor in the world market.

THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONALISM

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We are accustomed to speak of this profession and that profession, confident that in so describing certain vocations we are not violating popular usage. As in the case of a great many other terms commonly employed, familiarity engenders imprecision. If in the particular context the term does not jar upon our sense of fitness, but helps to convey a whole thought, we let it pass without questioning its definite content. Language thus becomes filled with terms having vague and indistinct boundaries. Not only is clear thinking hampered, but the meaning of our expressions is often obscured. Difficulties of intercourse thus accumulate and a check is placed upon progress in different fields of human endeavor. It is a part of the function of cultural education and of polite literature to clear up these constantly developing ambiguities. One of the most infallible marks of culture is the discriminative use of language, and that involves the occasional duty of explaining the exact scope and significance of certain terms.

For any serious study that would pretend to a scientific character, moreover, the need for precision in terminology is imperative. In the study of social institutions it is a special burden of the investigator to make clear at the outset the meaning to be attached to the terms he employs, since he must necessarily deal with his subject in terms which are in common use and which must frequently be surrounded with vague halos and faint odors even when, as will seldom happen, they have a uniform texture and color. These studies, therefore, have also a part to play in the preservation and development of language as an efficient medium for promoting the harmony and progress of life in society.

The professions are obviously means of getting a living.

That is the first and foremost fact about them. Each is an employment or vocation which men may choose as a means of "getting on in the world." Whatever else they may do, they provide an occupation and an income to those who follow them. It is this characteristic of the professions, indeed, which accounts for their generic name. Professions are constituted of those who declare or avow, or freely publicly own that they practice certain arts. And what is significant in the open declaration or avowal if not the invitation to patronage? Amateurs may practice these same arts, but they do not profess their practice. For them the practice of the art is not the pursuit of a livelihood. Hence why should they profess the art, or hold themselves out to the public as practicing it? It is this distinction between "professional" and "amateur" which has been conveniently adopted in the field of sport. "Professional" as there used has no other signification than that the individual follows the sport as a vocation. This restricted meaning of the term in its derived application is surely indicative of its main content in its original use. Etymologically, therefore, and ultimately, professions are simply vocations, though in the course of long usage the term has come to be applied only to a particular group or a certain type of callings.

It is true, of course, that some men choose and follow a professional career without any thought of dependence upon this work as a means of support. They are economically independent. But what occupation does not include some such members? There are many farmers who do not give their time to agriculture just in order to gain sustenance thereby. They may be quite indifferent to whether it yields them a net income or a net loss. But that neither prevents them from being farmers nor farming from being a "means of getting a living" in its most basic description.

The professions, however, appear to be marked off as a class from other occupations by which men gain economic support. What distinguishes them? The first observation which may be made is that they produce and sell services.

They do not deal in material commodities. The physician may, truly, "peddle pills," but his fee is fixed with but small account, even then, of the cost of the medicine. It is his prescription, his advice, that forms the real consideration for his fee. So with the lawyer and the engineer, it is not the "papers" and the "blue prints" which they sell, but their opinions, their advice. But obviously many other occupations that no one thinks of as professions sell services. The barber leaves you in possession of no material good in consideration of your having parted with some of your money in his shop. He renders you a service. The detective furnishes you with information. He sells his services. The dressmaker supplies you with suggestions of style and sometimes skillful needlework. The electric light and power plant supplies you with current, but is it not an immaterial service? The distinction between the professions and other lines of production clearly cannot be made by this simple test. It is inadequate. Nor will it do to add the personal factor to the service test. Some professional services are not personal services in any ordinary sense. Lawyers are consulted as frequently regarding problems of property as they are regarding personal problems, and the advice of engineers is sought almost exclusively concerning the arrangement of external objects.

The clew to the answer to our question is to be found in the descriptive word "advice," which we fell upon so frequently in the preceding paragraph. The services rendered by professional men spring from a trained mind. The sorts of services they sell require mental capability beyond the ordinary. Professional practice involves intellectual processes in its very nature. To be a professional man is to be equipped with a body of special knowledge which is not required by the common man in the every day conduct of life, and to use that knowledge to direct observation, to weigh facts, and to form judgments upon the problems and perplexities of whomsoever they serve in the field to which their special knowledge pertains. Professional services are of value, and more and more they are valued only in so far

as they are backed by knowledge, spring from practised and intelligent observation, and issue in wise and reliable counsel.

In the case of non-professional services, on the other hand, it is primarily a question of the provision of adequate mechanical equipment or application of a proper degree of manual dexterity or a combination of both. The transportation services offered by railways require in the construction of the necessary facilities a certain amount of intellectual work of a highly specialized order. This is where the civil engineer and mechanical engineer come in. It is in the exercise of their minds that they render their services. They must form responsible judgments in view of the special knowledge of a technical character which they possess. But the operation of the transportation system, once these facilities are available, does not require the application of any unusual, specialized, or technical knowledge. Judgments must be formed and considerable information must be accumulated. But the judgments involve only such knowledge as the common man may accumulate readily by experience. They are of a kindred order to those everybody must be ready to make in performing the ordinary business of life. The services which the railroad sells and which it provides through its plant and its employees are simply the application of force to matter with the instruments which are calculated to do the work. No one who receives the service cares a rap whether those who operate the system understand either the significance of what they are doing or how they are enabled to do it. The value of the service is conditioned by the speed and safety with which it is accomplished, not by the knowledge of those who perform it.

The distinction, it may be granted, is founded upon a difference of degree and not of kind. It is none the less significant. Lay services of most sorts doubtless are the better performed for being performed by a man of common sense. And to have "common sense" is to have some knowledge—at least that of the average grown person—and to be capable of using it in forming judgments. Moreover,

many of these non-professional, or lay, services require certain information and familiarity with certain rules that may only be obtained by a special training, and consequently these things are often beyond the ken of the consumers of the service. A carpenter, for instance, has to know how to divide the space between two levels so that steps of uniform height and depth may be constructed for passing from one level to the other. The common man would find difficulty in solving that problem. Nevertheless, the carpenter is not a professional man. His special knowledge does not give him understanding. It enables him to build stairways, but he has no comprehension of general laws which would enable him to solve related but not identical problems. In place of a knowledge of algebra, geometry, and trigonometry he has several "rules of thumb." There is the difference. The carpenter's special knowledge is only an adjunct to his manual skill. The services of the engineer get their peculiar value not from any dexterity or artistic ability which he may possess but from his mental powers. The extent to which he has mastered certain sciences in a special field and the quality of his judgments in applying that technical knowledge to concrete problems are the chief elements determining his professional rank.

It should be manifest, however, that the professions are not themselves sciences, nor their members simply scientists. Professional men are not characteristically and *per se* interested in advancing the "boundaries of knowledge." Their services have value because they are based on sciences. But the possession of the scientific knowledge is not the sole element making their services valuable. In part, the value of professional services depends upon the skill with which the mind trained in science grapples with concrete problems. The professions treat of "cases." Their members are expected to solve specific and practical problems. The teacher is always attempting to educate some particular children, the physician always attempting to cure some particular patients, and the clergyman always attempting to evangelize or to edify some particular persons

or families or group. Professional services are only half performed in determining upon a pathway or method of action. The execution of that plan is a matter of professional responsibility. There is an art in every profession.

Art is the molding of the external world to make it in a measure conform to an ideal of perfection. Art is the expression of an idea of beauty or of harmony. To struggle to impress upon one's environment forms that reflect or represent one's conception of perfection is to be an artist. Abstractly, that is what every profession is engaged in doing. The perfect world for physicians is a world from which disease has been banished. The perfect world for clergymen is a sinless world. The perfect world for teachers is a world that is ignorant of only one thing: ignorance. Thus it is with every profession. A profession is a body of men *using* science to transform the world into the mold of an ideal. Fundamentally, professional men are not inquirers; they are practicers. They are not in quest of knowledge but in quest of conditions which conform to their knowledge of how things ought to be. To paraphrase the words of a recent President, "they know what they want, and they know how to get it." The laymen knows and agrees upon what is wanted, but he does not know how to get it.

But in a much more specific sense it is true, also, that professional practice involves art. A physician must have acute senses trained to perceive things that might ordinarily pass unobserved. Moreover, he will customarily require some manual dexterity, in surgery if not in massage. The lawyer must be an orator, if not a good rhetorician; and a rhetorician, if not a good orator. It is necessary for the teacher not only "to know his subject" but to know how to teach it, also. The engineer can scarcely dispense with some skill in draughtsmanship or in surveying. The services of any profession, then, are based upon a science and imparted through an art, and because of these things the professions are differentiated from other economic pursuits.

While these distinctions might be adequate for mere economic classification, there is a further factor which it seems necessary to include in order to form a conception of professionalism that will serve as the background for a study of the professions—a study which is greatly needed and which it is to be hoped will shortly be essayed. This further factor is the possession by professional groups of special codes of morality. Standards of conduct for members are set up by custom and tradition, and where not explicitly adopted receive tacit approbation. They must, of course, conform to the rules of common morality. If they conflict, the whole group will eventually suffer in its intercourse with the rest of the community, the same as individual violators of the rules of common morality tend on the whole and in the long run to incur due penalties from the social disapprobation of their acts. Professional codes supplement the common moral code. They do not supplant it.

The relations of members among themselves are an important part of the subject matter of these conventions. The lawyer must not malign his rival. The physician must not assume charge of an illness which another physician has been attending, without the latter's consent. Plagiarism is the unpardonable sin among men in the academic profession. But perhaps even more significant is the control which professional ethics exercises over the relations of the profession to the public which it serves. In no profession is it permissible for a member to proffer his services where compensation is expected. In no profession may the quality of the service be regulated by the size of the fee, honorarium, salary, or stipend. In no profession may ulterior advantage be taken by the professional man of what passes between him and his client. Secrecy is binding in the absence of release.

It is not peculiar to the professions, however, that their economic relations are governed by moral rules. Every trade and business has some standards of right dealing. But in general they are not so rigorous as those of the professions, and those who are supposed to be subject to them are

seldom so conscious of them. Indeed, it seems doubtful whether trade ethics or business ethics may be properly described as distinct and independent codes of moral obligation. Are not the sole standards of conduct which plumbers and dry goods merchants and steel magnates recognize as morally binding those which are common to the whole human family? And is it not true that about the only ethical principles which have any effect in determining the course of business conduct of these groups, notwithstanding pious resolutions in annual conventions and public declarations by trade unions, are those general rules of right and wrong which have managed to get legislative sanction and administrative recognition? "Business is business." At least it must be admitted that tradesmen and business men are not so conscious of moral obligations imposed by the occupational group as are professional men. Such efforts as are made, therefore, to promote stricter conformance to ethical standards in these lay groups prove less successful.

On the other hand, it is not to be gainsaid that there is much vaporous moralizing among professional men. There is a difference frequently between what they are at heart and in practice and what they are in profession. Those who have read the masterly story of the life of Carol Kennecott will recall how superficial was the restraint of some of the ethical norms imposed by the profession upon the doctors in *Gopher Prairie*. Even more clearly has this situation been portrayed in Mr. Lewis's latest novel, *Arrow-smith*. Jealous each of his practice, venomously depreciating one another's competence, seeking to outwit one another in capturing new patients by surreptitious means, and even sometimes venturing to prolong illness in order to keep a lucrative source of revenue—the professional competition among physicians is shown to be saturated with charlatanry and to bear a substantial resemblance to traditional trade rivalry. These novels are too confoundingly real to let one escape without the conviction that the obligations of professional decorum rest lightly on more than a few shoulders

perfumed with formaldehyde. But even in the case of these "businesslike" physicians, and certainly taking in view the whole profession, it may be suggested that the striving even for outward conformity to the standards recognized by the group is not without its beneficial aspect. "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp"; and, to paraphrase the same incomparable poet, "What I aspired to be, and was not, exalts me."

Why is it that we find the development of group ethics to be higher, the specification of what is right and wrong in economic relations to be clearer among the professions than among other occupations? It certainly cannot be seriously affirmed that the professions constitute a selected class of inherently just and virtuous men. Rather, the circumstance would seem to spring in large part from the character of the relations which exist between professional men and those whom they serve. The relation must necessarily be one of trust and confidence. With respect to the subject matter of their dealings the professional man and his client, pupil, patient, or parishioner stand on different intellectual planes. The professional man has knowledge and capacity which the client lacks, in the field of the client's trouble or problem. The client, therefore, inevitably must be at a disadvantage if he has to deal with the professional man "at arm's length." In fact, it is inconceivable that professional practice so carried on would yield any substantial economic utility. The client must give his problem over to the professional man in full confidence and trust that the latter will do all that he can to find a solution. The client has no reliable means of checking up on the work of the professional man. He operates in a region where the client has neither map, compass, nor guide-posts. His services can be measured only by the unsatisfactory and *ex post facto* test of results.

There is, however, a still more vital reason than this unequal footing of buyer and seller which explains the higher—or more detailed—ethical development among the professions. The professions are purveyors of services touching the most intimate interests in the lives of their clients.

Affairs that stir the emotions of men most deeply are the affairs in which professional services are sought. It is concerning matters of life and death, matters of destiny, matters of safety, matters of honor, matters of pride—it is concerning matters like these that professional men are asked to render service. When men are in trouble they want help, guidance, protection. The professions exist to satisfy these wants. To them people turn for health, for education, for safety, for justice, for peace of mind.

It is obvious that the utility of services rendered in affairs lying so close to the hearts of men is vastly augmented if the purveyors of these services may be approached with confidence. Other things being equal, the professional man is likely to be able to perform a much greater service for the client if the latter gives himself over without reserve to his professional adviser. This is so evidently true in the case of the medical practitioner and the lawyer that it requires no further comment in these connections. It is also true that the engineer can do much better work if he is first supplied with the entire mass of facts, calculations, and speculations relevant to the undertaking projected, and then left to reach a solution of the problem unhampered by suggestions and reservations from the client. Every teacher likewise knows that if he does not enjoy the confidence of the student both his time and the student's is being wasted. The mind of the student must not only be open but also be receptive, and it cannot be either if doubt of the motives (or competence) of the instructor is entertained. The teacher who is fighting against the suspicion or blank indifference of a student cannot at the same time be concentrating on the most effective presentation of the subject matter. Much the same remarks will be seen to apply with heightened significance and clearer meaning to the relations between clergymen and their parishioners.

Moreover, the utility of professional services to the client is greater, other things being equal, if there exists no need for him to reflect on the disinterestedness of their source. As a laymen he seeks professional services in order to be

relieved from the mental responsibility for certain problems which he either cannot solve or does not trust himself to be able to solve. To compass his difficulties he regards some intellectual help as desirable, if not indispensable. The professional mind, however, is so far superior to his own intellectual equipment for grappling with his particular difficulty (and this is necessarily so if the professional services are to be objectively competent), and the professional art so much more perfected than his own that the client finds himself quite ignorant of the plan and purpose of what is being done in his behalf. Under these circumstances he clearly will not be much better off for having purchased these services if he cannot count upon a certain moral responsibility being assumed by the professional practitioner in addition to his intellectual responsibility. Otherwise the client will simply have substituted worry and fear regarding the method and manner of compassing the primary difficulty for the burden of the primary difficulty itself.

It should be evident, then, that there is sound economic reason for the development in the professions of codes of ethics which specifically cover the various conjunctions of circumstances commonly confronting members of professions as such. It will hardly be denied, moreover, that the additional restraints thus imposed upon professional men are effective in determining their conduct, at least in the measure that the current rules of morality are effective in controlling the conduct of the common man. As a result of this preliminary analysis, it seems justifiable to formulate the definition of a profession as a means of making a living based directly upon science, carried on by a special art, and dignified by an ethical code. It may need to be repeated, however, that neither in its dependence upon science, nor in its employment of an art, nor in its observance of special rules of moral conduct, does a profession stand wholly apart from ordinary lay occupations. In each of these respects the professions are distinguished only by a more pronounced development. If this be true, it is manifest that the possibility of professionalism is inherent in every occupation. It

becomes important, therefore, to determine just where to draw the line separating professional from non-professional occupations. It would be tedious and fruitless effort to attempt an authoritative division of a long list of vocations into the professional and non-professional categories. Common usage appears, however, to limit the professional occupations to six: the clerical, the medical, the legal, the academic, the engineering, and the dental. Perhaps the grounds of this delimitation may best be ascertained from an examination of the attributes of a few of the vocations making pretensions to a professional status which, it is believed, is not generally accorded them. The justification for the inclusion of dentistry and engineering with the four "learned professions" will not be made a matter of special inquiry, but that there are good grounds for the popular custom of accepting them as professions should become evident by the contrast which they present in respect to some of the considerations which may account for the exclusion of some of the border-line vocations.

One of the occupations which has most persistently striven to establish itself on a professional footing is accounting. It must be acknowledged that it approaches closely to the requisite conditions as indicated by the results of our analysis. It is based upon the science of economics, and more immediately upon the science of accounting itself. It must be conceded, however, that the latter is a very narrow and limited field of technical knowledge. Though we may speak of it as a science, it clearly is not a science of the same order, as, for example, physiology or thermodynamics. It is a consciously systematic ordering of a complex mass of data, scientific by definition. Yet it arises but little above the classificatory processes of common sense. It is neither profound nor perplexing. After the acquisition of a very few relatively simple principles, in which it is true a short special training is necessary, the limit of development in the science has been reached, though development in the art—the use of judgment in constructing accounting systems, in applying them, and in interpreting their results

—may continue indefinitely. While the formulation of an accountant's code of ethics has been made and there is earnest effort to enforce its prescriptions, in such matters a certain amount of aging seems to be indispensable. Traditions have to become ingrained in the members of the group as a group, and that takes time.

A professional code of ethics is more than a verbal proclamation of "rules" of conduct. It is an habitual mode of thinking regarding obligations and privileges in human relationships, that sometimes consciously but more often subconsciously influences a person's action no less at the critical junctures of professional experience than in the manner of living from day to day. In short, professional morality is at bottom an attitude of mind respecting personal duties, characteristic of the particular occupational group, and growing up from the conditions under which the economic struggle of the group is carried on. Since this professional morality has arisen out of and in response to habits of life which long experience has accredited as proper professional behavior, its sanctions are sufficient unto themselves. For that very reason authority of ethical prescriptions increases directly with age. To deliberately question or violate them is not only bad form, but in time becomes essentially bad. No argument can change the nature of goodness and badness. It is the same, of course, with common morality. Nevertheless, in both cases the content of ethical prescriptions is always, however slowly, changing.

Morality is subject to mincing modification, though never to violent overhauling. Those rules which change least have the strongest hold upon the people. Indeed, since morality is the most pervasive method by which social control is exercised over individual action, it must in its very nature be sacrosanct. If it were not, it could not fulfill its *raison d'être*. It is a cumbrous juggernaut flattening out the bumps of caprice and eccentricity which bulge much above the common level. Professional morality has a like function and the same stern sanction within its limited field as has ordinary social ethics in the whole region of human

conduct. It is a bulwark to group preservation, a means to the expansion of the group life. It is an expression of the group will to survive and a manifestation of the will to progress. Wherever the exercise of individual judgment might imperil group interests, ethical norms grow up to restrict the area of individual choice. But in such occupations as accounting, or auditing, the interests of the group can hardly be said to be so closely knit and unified as yet that special norms of vocational conduct are recognized as of a binding character, essential to group survival. In these vocations further development of a professional code of ethics awaits the further growth of a sense of group solidarity.

Of late years there has been much heard of the "profession" of journalism. There are several reasons for omitting this occupation from our professional list, however. It seems hardly warrantable to speak of newsgathering as a science. Its principles are inexact and do not constitute a well organized and articulated body of special knowledge. The occupation is dependent to a degree upon certain sciences, for example, psychology, sociology, and political science. But the connection is so indirect and at the present time non-vital, that one might with equal propriety contend that blacksmithing is a profession in so far as its practice involves some apprehension of physical laws and the principles of metallurgy. There is, it is true, a highly developed art of journalistic writing. But this is perhaps the least distinctive attribute of professionalism.

One of the primary contributions of a professional code of ethics to the content of professionalism is the sense of dignity and intellectual independence which it imparts. This is manifestly impossible where within the ordinary reaches of vocational conduct the worker is not master of himself. So long as journalists are employees of publishers conducting the business of disseminating news, and particularly trade news, *i.e.*, advertising, for private profit, it will be difficult for professionalism to gain much headway among them. Their services will be controlled and directed

by men dominated by interests and motives alien to the professional mind. Professionalism and employee subserviency are incompatible. If the great public service of disseminating the information that feeds public opinion becomes socialized, or even endowed by private munificence, the prospect of a more vital development of professionalism among the journalists, will be enhanced. Though under such circumstances the salary system might continue, and probably would, the academic profession in a similar condition has not found it impossible to maintain the professional spirit. It must be granted, however, that the professors are finding "eternal vigilance the price of liberty." By organization, by jealously asserting and defending its moral right to freedom from control in educational matters, and by zealous inculcation of respect for this part of its ethical traditions among younger members, the academic profession is attempting to uphold and upbuild the professional spirit within its ranks under severe handicaps.

Finally, concerning the claims of those engaged in social service that their work is properly to be classed as professional, this vocation seems to present in many aspects the same difficulties as does journalism. Social service employment involves formation of judgments based upon close study and extended observation. It involves some intellectual responsibility, but as yet science cannot be said to be an essential preparation for the practice of the art. No special training in any particular science appears to be requisite. Nevertheless, it is certainly desirable that the social worker have at least a passing acquaintance with hygiene, psychology, statistics, law, and sociology, and in time these studies may become essential to qualification for social service. At present, however, social workers are chiefly borrowers from other professions in so far as their duties involve the application of scientific thought to concrete case material. It would be harsh to speak of them as interlopers, but at least it may be said that they act in the main as coördinators, intermediaries, supplementers of the strictly professional services.

That social workers must and do cultivate an art in the performance of their duties none will deny. Nurses in particular acquire a technique that perhaps requires more painstaking and constant attention and has a more vital relation to their proficiency than that of some of the learned professions, *e.g.*, the legal profession. In the matter of group ethics, also, certainly few employments would seem to have a greater need of ethical control from the point of view of the economic well-being of the group than that of social service. Here, as in the case of the accountants and the journalists, the development of a genuinely efficacious ethical code takes time. Social workers are often too conscious of their moral obligations and as a group too little concerned with the enforcement of their observance in individual conduct. On the whole, however, social service seems to have the essential elements of professionalism and to be tending toward a solid professional status.

It appears, then, that the number of occupations which may reasonably at the present time be regarded as professions and still retain any significance in the classification, is restricted to the six mentioned. There is no intention to be dogmatic on this point, however. Others for different purposes, or viewing the matter in a different light, might choose to expand or to contract the boundaries here laid down. Certainly at another time a list made by the same tests and with identical considerations might be much longer—or shorter.

AGRICULTURE AND THE DISPARITY IN PRICES

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I. GETTING ON COMMON GROUND

Since 1920 agriculture has been passing through the greatest economic depression known to the present generation of farmers. The result has been that no question today is receiving more consideration from the press and public officials than that of relief for this situation. But, likewise, all industries have felt, in greater or less degree, the heavy hand of depression. In so far as depression affects all industries alike, the causes of and remedies for the agricultural situation are identical with those which cause or remedy general economic depressions. Agriculture, however, has suffered not only depression, but a more acute depression than have other industries. Agricultural prices fell first, fell fastest, and fell farthest. This has meant that during the period from July, 1920, to the present time there has been a great and continuous disparity between prices prevailing for agricultural products and those prevailing for other commodity groups. The causes of this relatively greater depression in agriculture are not identical with the causes of the general business depression, of which agriculture necessarily shares its part. Current proposals for the formulation of an agricultural policy, however, quite generally fail to differentiate between those aspects of the depression in agriculture which are a reflection of the business cycle and those aspects of the depression which are peculiar to agriculture alone. The problem in the former case is largely that of mitigating the economic consequences of a violent downward trend of prices. Declining prices, to the extent that they are a reflection of that phase of the business cycle known as depression, are not confined to particular industrial groups, but rather cut

across the whole range of industry; and the chief economic problem growing out of such decline is that of securing justice between debtor and creditor classes. Economic depressions of this general nature, therefore, involve no problems peculiar to agriculture. If prices for agricultural products had fallen no faster than the general level of prices, the post-war situation of agriculture would have been no worse than its pre-war condition, except in so far as the farmers constitute primarily a debtor class and would, therefore, have borne relatively heavier burdens.

In addition to the two foregoing ailments the farmer is suffering simultaneously from a third, namely, the customarily low returns to labor and capital employed in agriculture as compared with other industries. But the problem of the disparity between agricultural and other prices is the one which concerns us here. It is this problem that has provoked so much post-war interest in agriculture. This particular problem can in no way be clarified by considering it in conjunction with the two foregoing ones. Questions of the business cycle and of low farmer incomes are real problems pressing for solution. But they are also old and very distinct ones, and have no direct bearing upon causes of the post-war price relationships. Many reasons given for the present relatively greater depression in agriculture explain very adequately why the farmer has always been forced to accept a relatively low level of income, but they are inadequate to explain why, so suddenly after 1920, his products commanded even less in our markets in terms of other commodities. In explanation of the above situation it is often said that the farmer is relatively inefficient. He may be, but he is no doubt as efficient today as he was during the ten-year pre-war period. True, his inefficiency may account for high farm prices, due to high costs, but it hardly accounts for low prices. Another argument advanced in explanation of the present plight of the farmer as regards purchasing power—namely, that his taxes have become more burdensome since the beginning of the war—throws little light on the question of price relationships.

High taxes reduce net incomes only; they do not lower farm prices. Indeed, it might logically be contended that higher taxes, by eliminating sub-marginal producers, tend to raise agricultural prices. The present farmer problem, in so far as it is a post-war problem, is concerned primarily with factors affecting price relationships only.

II. THE ISSUE

The farmer's condition during the period of 1900 to 1919 was not an unprosperous one. During most of this time prices for the products he had to sell rose faster than the general level of prices. The value of land in farms in the United States increased from an average of \$15.57 per acre in 1900 to an average value of \$32.40 per acre in 1910. During the period from 1896 to 1910 prices for agricultural products increased 80 per cent while prices of non-agricultural products increased only 40 per cent. Moreover, during much of the war period farm prices were such that the purchasing power of the farm products group ranged from 102 to 115-cent dollars. But, unfortunately for the farmer, his prices did not stay up; not only was there an absolute drop, but it was relatively greater than in other industries. From a purchasing power of 110 the farmer's dollar suffered an abrupt descent to the low level of 65 in the latter part of 1921 and early in 1922. This indicates that the prices of other products had a greater facility for staying up under the brewing of the storm of depression than did agricultural prices. The issue, then, is not why agricultural prices fell at all—that is the problem of the business cycle—but why they fell to a relatively lower level. Since this study is concerned primarily with price relationships since the war, it obviously should exclude from consideration all factors and forces operating to lower the level of farm income prior to and during the war. It should likewise exclude from consideration all factors which since the war have tended to reduce the farmers' level of income other than by lowering the price of his products.

The post-war problem in agriculture is concerned with the question: Why did agriculture have to accept relatively greater price declines than did other industries? The number of the forces bearing upon this question both directly and indirectly, remotely as well as immediately, is legion. But we are here concerned chiefly with the economic causes directly affecting price relationships. Further inquiry as to what these forces are makes necessary some analysis of demand and supply factors in the determination of price changes.

III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEGREE OF PRICE CHANGE

The degree of price change within an industry during a period of depression varies with (a) the ability of the industry to make adjustments in production commensurate with the actual effective demand for its products, and (b) with the degree of inelasticity of the demand for its products, considered in relation, of course, to the ability to adjust or curtail production. In this respect the two factors are complementary with rather than independent of each other. That is to say, wherever the ability to curtail production is without limitation, the degree of elasticity is a matter of no significance. Or, in other words, any tendency of the price to drop due to a relative oversupply of the product in question could be offset by further curtailment of supply. It is true, then, that the degree of elasticity under such conditions would be an index of the amount of curtailment necessary. But whenever there are limitations to curtailment of supply—and this is usually the case, although there are variations in this regard as between different industries—then the inelastic nature of a demand may serve as a club in the hands of economic law to beat down prices. It is this double handicap that is responsible for the relatively heavier burden which, as evidenced by price relationships and purchasing power, is now borne by agriculture.

But the actual weight of the burden on agriculture is somewhat less than the proportionate price decline would

indicate. This, however, is another matter. Suffice it to say here that many industries which were able to maintain relatively high prices did so at the expense of production and gross sales—a policy hardly less disastrous to such producers than was the price decline to the farmer with his approximately constant volume of production. On the other hand, it is often argued that since the farmer lost money on each unit of his product, he became worse off because of his larger production. But such a conclusion is hardly valid. It may be true of the farm manager whose volume of production was due to a policy of expansion and whose gross operating expenses had been augmented by charges for the hire of additional labor and capital. But for the family-sized unit, which is generally prevalent in this country, the expenses of producing a crop for any given year are mainly *fixed charges*—for example, interest on land, interest and depreciation on tools and equipment, expenditures for feed and keep of work stock and the family labor force—from which there is no escape. They are incurred once for all irrespective of the extent of productive operations. Under such conditions it hardly seems plausible to contend that the individual farmer is less well off by having a large crop to sell rather than a small one.

But let us return to this double handicap of the farmer. If we grant that the inelastic nature of the demand for his products does exist, then the question arises: Why did agriculture go on producing after the depression struck, and to what extent did agriculture differ in this respect from other production groups?

In the first place, agricultural producers were unable to reduce their labor force. In the main, the farmer's labor force consists of himself and his family. These he cannot dismiss. If he decrees that they shall not work, he is none the less responsible for their upkeep. So long as he and his family remain on the farm his economic interest is served best by producing more, not less.

Secondly, the shift from farming to other lines of work

is accompanied by almost insurmountable difficulties. Farming is not a job which one can quit at will, but is a business and an investment that cannot be readily abandoned. Periods during which farming does not pay are those periods in which those who have farms must stay on them.

Thirdly, the farming business is necessarily one of slow turnover. Shifts of emphasis in production within the industry can be made at best only once in a year, or some twenty-five to thirty times in the farming life of an individual. This slow turnover makes the forecasting of production and prices a year hence practically impossible at planting time, or at any rate very inaccurate. This element of uncertainty in the industry tends to cause producers to hope for good prices by a lucky turn in the wheel of fortune rather than by adjustment in production.

Fourthly, for the average American farmer, costs in farm production consist in the main of fixed charges rather than operating costs. This is synonymous with saying that the value of the farmer's plant and equipment is large in proportion to gross annual value of his product. In this respect, the farmer's position is similar to that of a railway concern, in that capacity operation is a matter of no small importance. A fact which often leads to confusion on this point is that for farmers as a whole the total value of a smaller crop may be more than that of a larger one. But what is true when applied to the industry as a whole is not true of the farmer taken singly. This is so because he must sell at the market price, irrespective of his quantity of production. Therefore, if the price is determined outside the limits of his farm, the individual farmer is much better off if his farm plant has been run at capacity. It must be understood, also, that the reasoning here applies to the whole farm plant rather than to any particular crop, for example, cotton. It stands to reason that if cotton is selling at a price below cost of production the greater the percentage of a farm planted to cotton during any current year, the more money lost on cotton. But even here the farmer has neither the option of increasing nor of curtailing farming

operations; his only option is that of planting one crop in preference to another. Evidently, total physical farm production is not cut down by such a policy. There is less of one crop only because there is more of another.¹

Fifthly, due to the great number of farmers and the extended character of all their operations, there has been found as yet, no organization or production policy able to adjust production effectively in accordance with a fluctuating market demand.

IV. RELATIONSHIPS IN POST-WAR PRODUCTION

The foregoing discussion is theoretical, and, it might be contended, has no bearing upon the disparity between agricultural prices and the price of other commodities. It has been alleged, moreover, that the argument is discredited for two reasons, namely: it intimates that this disparity was due to overproduction in agriculture; and it argues that there was relative, if not absolute overproduction due to a great slump in European demand for American goods. In support of the first of these objections, *i.e.*, that the argument implies that overproduction caused the agricultural crisis, there has been presented a comparison of production in 1920, when the crash came, with the five-year average production, 1909-1913, "which shows that the number of milk cows per capita is equal to the five-year average, the number of hogs somewhat in excess of the average, as was the production of wheat and corn, while the production of cotton and the number of sheep and cattle was somewhat below the average. The production of wheat, corn, and cotton, and the number of sheep, hogs, cattle, and milk cows per 1,000 population was exceeded in each case in a number of years from 1890 to 1920, and in no case during that period was there a decline of the price in the commodities proportionate to the decline which took place in 1920 and 1921."²

¹Any reasoning of this nature regarding volume of farm production assumes constancy of weather and climatic conditions.

²Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, Sixty-seventh Congress, Report No. 408, Part I, p. 84.

But it is of material importance to the question to know whether or not such other years of apparent overproduction were years in which a general crisis occurred, and so whether or not there were marked changes in quantity production of other goods and in the value of money such as occurred in the latter part of 1920 and the years following.

In support of the argument that the European demand did not fall off to any marked degree, facts are adduced showing that our exports of food and food products to Europe were not very greatly less during 1920 and thereafter than they had been formerly. However true this may be, quantity purchased is a very indefinite measure of value except in relation to a known price. We were selling to Europe after 1920 at a price approximately one-half that prevailing only a few years previous in order to induce her to make approximately her usual volume of purchases. For this same volume she paid us only about half as much in total value. It would, indeed, be a queer version of the law of supply and demand to contend that even under such circumstances Europe's demand for our agricultural products was no less strong than formerly.

Irrespective of the foregoing, in the last analysis, the effective demand for agricultural products consists of offers of exchangeable commodities. A point vital to this discussion is to determine what disturbances occurred in the total supply of commodities and the relationship of the supply of particular commodities to the volume of agricultural products. This information is relevant just here because economic depressions are accompanied by disturbed facilities for exchange and consequently by a lull, if not actual stagnation, in the usual business turnover. Price relationships are disturbed, varying, in the case of different commodities as compared to the general price level, inversely with the principles enunciated above, namely, ability to curtail production, and, as complementary to this factor, the degree of elasticity of the demand.

There is an abundance of good statistical material at hand which points to the conclusion that, during this period

of generally declining business, agricultural products continued to be poured upon the markets of the country in a far greater abundance than were other commodities. The daily trade service of the Standard Statistics Company gives an index number of industrial production for 1921 which shows the volume of production to be not more than 75 per cent of normal.³ A good index of business turnover is the total freight tonnage originating on the railways of the United States. In reviewing these figures we find that the volume of general merchandise⁴ shrank from a total of 92 millions of short tons in 1919 to a total of 41.9 millions in 1921. The total products of mines thus transported were some 9 million tons less in 1921 than in 1919. Total freight car loadings show a similar drop, with a total of approximately 4.5 million carloads less in 1921 than were handled in 1920.⁵ But the same sources show no such falling off in tonnage of agricultural products moving to market. The stream is approximately constant. Expressed in thousands of short tons, it was as follows from 1917-1923:

Years	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Total farm products.....	140,723	156,032	155,460	147,110	146,810	147,151	146,713

It is not surprising, therefore, to see that agricultural prices suffered a greater proportionate drop than did prices of non-agricultural products. This price relationship is shown in the following index numbers:

Index Numbers of Wholesale Price by Groups of Commodities, 1919-1924 ⁶						
Years	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
Non-agricultural products	199	241	167	168	171	162
Farm products.....	231	218	124	133	141	143

³Standard Statistics Company, New York.—*Statistical Bulletin*, fourth quarter, 1925, p. 1.

⁴In less than carload shipments.

⁵Data from *Railway Age*, Vols. 69, 74, and 79, and U. S. D. A. *Year Book*, 1924, pp. 1156-57.

⁶U. S. D. A. *Year Book*, 1924, pp. 1180-1182.

The endeavor to explain this price discrepancy gives rise to varied opinions. It is fundamental in formulating a relief program for agriculture. More light can be thrown upon the question by presentation of some production data in the iron and steel industry. In lay agricultural circles it seems to be quite generally believed that this industry is quite favorably situated with respect to its power to arbitrarily fix prices. The presentation of such data will also throw some light upon the question as to whether or not farmers, through strong organizations, can also achieve similar powers of price control. Ex-Governor Frank Lowden expressed the opinion not long ago that "there is only one difference in all the world between steel and wheat as to the marketing of either, and that difference is that the steel industry is highly organized, while the agricultural industry is not organized."⁷ The difference seems to be greater than is here recognized. A more accurate statement would be to say that owing to the peculiar nature of agriculture, with all its elements of uncertainty as to quantity production, output is the largest factor in determining price; in the case of steel, with production factors more tangible, price is the largest factors in determining the output.⁸ While agriculture was producing a bit more than the usual quantity of products, total pig iron production in the United States fell from 36.4 million gross tons in 1920 to a total of only 16.5 million gross tons in 1921. In 1921, it is well to note, total railway equipment orders were the smallest in many years, a condition which indicates that production of iron and steel had fallen off because the demand had declined. In the related field of coke production we notice the same slowing up. Total production in short tons fell from a total of 51.3 millions in 1920 to only 25.3 millions in 1921.⁹ This relationship between the demand for

⁷In National Wheat Growers' Advisory Committee's pamphlet, *Pooling the Nation's Wheat*, p. 5.

⁸By price is meant here not absolute price, but rather profit margins in price.

⁹Standard Statistics Company's *Statistical Bulletin*, fourth quarter 1925, pp. 53-54, and *Mineral Resources of U. S.*, 1922, p. 36A.

steel and the production of steel is indicated more clearly by the relationship between average monthly unfilled orders of the United States Steel Corporation, average monthly production of pig iron, and average monthly pig iron furnaces in blast, *i.e.*, per cent of total furnaces, 1917-1924.

Year	Unfilled orders of U. S. Steel Cor- poration (mil- lions of gross tons)	Monthly Pig Iron Production (millions of gross tons)	Pig Iron Fur- naces in Blast (percentage of total) ¹⁰
1917	10.72	31.82	78.7
1918	8.56	32.09	79.9
1919	6.04	25.49	56.3
1920	10.03	30.35	66.2
1921	5.32	13.79	24.2
1922	5.65	22.40	42.1
1923	6.01	33.38	65.6
1924	3.99	25.92	49.5

Such curtailment of production is most profitable under conditions wherein "operating charges" constitute a large factor in costs. Such portion of these charges as are due to wages of labor do not fall, with the approach of depression, as rapidly as do prices in general. Therefore, any curtailment of production may tend to keep up the unit price of the commodity nearer its old cost level. But, as has been shown above, this is done at tremendous loss in volume of business. Price relationships are, therefore, not good indices of the extent of farm depression in comparison with other industries. Varying conditions of production and cost, as stated above, would not always make it more profitable to sell X units of a commodity at $2y$ dollars per unit than to sell $2X$ units of another commodity at y dollars per unit. For this reason we cannot determine accurately the relative severity of the post-war depression in the agricultural industry.

¹⁰*Statistical Bulletin* (N. Y.), fourth quarter, 1925, pp. 54, 55.

And in other industries the relationship between the post-war volume of industrial production on the one hand and that of agricultural production on the other, is well indicated by developments in the agricultural implement industry. It took many more bushels of wheat to buy a grain binder or a cultivator in 1921 than it had taken during the pre-war period. All prices had fallen, but not in equal degree. Wages in the implement business, as well as other costs, were practically the same. The economical procedure, therefore, was to curtail production in 1921 and sell implements in 1921 which were manufactured in 1920. That this was done is evidenced by sales data and by the fact that the number of persons engaged in the production of agricultural implements and machinery decreased from a total of 67,177 in 1919 to only 38,302 in 1921. Actual production data is relevant at this point. It is as follows:

Farm Equipment Manufactured in the United States, 1920-1922¹¹

Kind of Implement	1920 Number	1921 Number	1922 Number
Planting machinery.....	472,248	310,855	189,230
Plowers and listers.....	1,361,578	566,209	441,800
Cultivators	580,179	477,627	259,535
Tractors (gas).....	203,207	73,198	99,692
Haying machinery.....	411,556	219,429	154,367
Harvesting machinery.....	232,177	119,111	80,565

Although the agricultural implement business was curtailed, prices dropped nevertheless, and the total value of the products declined no less sharply than did the total value of farm products. The result was that during the years from 1921-1923 the agricultural implement manufacturers had very hard sledding, indeed. Curtailed production in each plant saved the industry. But an equal degree of curtailment of total production on the part of the individual farmer, unless he knows other farmers are going to do likewise, would mean his bankruptcy. On the other hand, if he knows, or even suspects, that others are going to curtail

¹¹U. S. D. A. *Year Book*, 1923, p. 1156.

their production, it is then as certainly to his enrichment not to do so.

The farmer's costs of production are largely fixed charges. With the agricultural implement manufacturer, as well as other manufacturers, this is not the case. The individual concern can, therefore, curtail to its advantage; while the individual farmer is not in position to do so. At any rate the surest path to the farmer's prosperity is through curtailment of production by reducing the number of farmers, thereby giving each the benefits of volume of production at high prices, rather than through individual farm curtailment which would result in higher prices for a lower volume of production with operating charges remaining practically fixed, however.

Upon the questions raised in the foregoing discussion hinges very largely the feasibility of various programs for agricultural relief. It seems that, in the last analysis, there are some fundamental differences between the nature of the agricultural industry and manufacturing or commerce. If this be so, then the methods of one in production or selling can not be advantageously aped by the other. Again, measures for temporary relief of agriculture must differ materially from permanent policies. Furthermore, are we as yet prepared to say that all-inclusive farmers' commodity organizations can effectively regulate production in relation to demand, and if so will such limitation have to come through restriction upon the number of farmers or by curtailment of individual farm operations through some scheme of taxation of producers, or arbitrary supervision of his productive efforts?

MEASURING AMERICANISM

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I

Since the beginning of our existence as a nation we of America have had to deal with the problem of assimilating large numbers of people differing from us in such fundamental characteristics as race, language, and national allegiance. It has been our task to receive the flow of millions from Europe and transform them as best we could into united, homogeneous Americans. We have been guided in this task solely by our own experience; no other country has ever had an assimilation problem at all comparable to ours. Other nations have added alien groups to their populations, but the addition has been accomplished, in the main, by the annexation of the inhabited territory. Most frequently these transfers of alien groups have come as the result of war, in which the stronger nation has appropriated a portion of the weaker as the reward of victory. Naturally, the relations between the conqueror and the conquered have seldom been friendly, and often the mutual ill-feeling has been further intensified by the coercive denationalization methods resorted to by the governing authorities. Such a situation bears no resemblance to that existing in our country, where the immigrant comes of his own accord, usually willing enough to learn our ways and become one of us.

Population movements to countries other than the United States have not up to the present demanded much adaptation on the part of the migrating individuals. The new settler has usually found himself in a sparsely populated region with a comparatively low native culture. He has imposed his own culture upon the original inhabitants with little

difficulty and has continued to speak the language, to practice the arts and to live under the social institutions which he brought with him from his homeland. Like those who came to America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he has been a colonist rather than an immigrant.

The difference between this kind of population movement and our own is at once apparent. For the colonist, the problem of adaptation is limited to the physical and economic fields. A colder climate may require him to change the form of his house or the material of his clothing; a thinner soil may require the adoption of unfamiliar methods of agriculture. But social adaptation is unnecessary; the colonist, having come to a land which had almost no social environment, could continue to enjoy that of his own group. The contrast between this situation and that which confronts the new arrival in America is marked indeed. Our immigrant must not only adjust himself to the conditions of climate and the system of production, but he must change almost every detail of the body of habits and manners which distinguish him as a person. He must break with all the groups into which he was born and establish new relationships with people who are indifferent or even hostile to his advances. He must give up most of what he has come to know as himself and acquire new characteristics, at first strange and incomprehensible. Small wonder that there have been innumerable difficulties and many failures in a process involving such profound change.

In this process Americans have always felt a keen interest, and justifiably so, for upon its ultimate success has depended to a considerable extent our ability to maintain ourselves as a people. We have named the process "Americanization" and busied ourselves with the devising and proclaiming of programs for its acceleration. It cannot be said, however, that we owe our national life to the consistent following of a plan. Our devices have been too hastily constructed and too diverse in their methods to permit their practical application.

II

A review of the accumulation of Americanization programs reveals a great variety, ranging from the advocacy of a complete *laissez faire* policy on the one hand to one of strict exclusion on the other. The defenders of the former maintain that the process will work best if allowed to take its own course. They would admit all foreigners with only such restrictions as are necessary to prevent our being used as a dumping ground for criminals and defectives. They profess implicit faith in the capacity of the melting pot to fuse the raw material of immigration into the superior alloy of Americanism. It is as if there were behind the process a mysterious, irresistible force, seizing upon every arrival at Ellis Island and transforming him surely and swiftly into a good American citizen.

Strictly speaking, such a policy cannot be called a plan. It is nothing more than the expression of a careless optimism, based on ignorance and upheld by a naive belief in the infectiousness of Americanism. Intelligent interest in the country's welfare can have no part in the formulation of such a policy. It is a complete denial of our ability to direct the course of our development consciously and rationally.

The same ignorance and refusal to take the facts into consideration are characteristic of those who offer programs of the opposite kind. They demand absolute and instant conformity on part of the immigrant. If he shows any disposition to delay his Americanization, he must be prodded along by law and ordinance. Immediately on landing in America he must discard his old-world culture like an outworn garment and put on the red, white and blue. The advocates of this program are especially intolerant of the minor differences which distinguish the foreigner. "What can you expect," cries one, "of the Americanism of a man whose breath reeks of garlic?" This kind of program might aptly be named "steam-roller Americanization."

At the very farthest extreme stand those who believe in America for Americans. This nation was founded by our

fathers, so runs the argument, and transmitted to us as a heritage to keep intact in order that we may in turn transmit it intact to our children. To these persons the immigrants are a hostile force invading the land to enjoy its bounties at the expense of the rightful owners. Americanization is the squandering of a patrimony, an unpardonable offense against the future generations of our country.

Between these extremes there are Americanization plans of every sort. To many the word "Americanization" means something very much like a religious conversion, to be brought about by exhortation and emotional appeals. The old-fashioned Fourth-of-July celebration with its brass-band music and bombastic oratory furnishes an example of the methods pursued under such a plan. The object is to imbue the foreigner with the notion that American ways and institutions are superior to all others. Reasons and valid arguments are not employed to convince him; he is, as a matter of fact, not supposed to be convinced; he is to be converted. To this end are recounted the glories of our past, the achievements of our heroes, and the ideals which presumably underlie the establishment and maintenance of our political organization.

Other Americanization plans prove on examination to be schemes for influencing the foreign vote or means of defense against movements called "radicalism." These programs find supporters chiefly among those whose economic interests are directly involved. They are obviously insincere and cannot be fairly thought of as attempts to solve the problem to the best interests of all concerned.

Still other programs might be mentioned, some of them minutely detailed, but the examples given are sufficient to show the diversity of our notions as to how we should assimilate the immigrant. Our years of experience have taught us but little. On one point alone have we come to a fairly general agreement, namely, that somehow or other, Americanization is a good thing and deserving of our attention.

III

If we look back of these programs for an explanation of their diversity, we find that the goal toward which they are directed is even more uncertainly defined than the way. To the question, "What is Americanism?" there are a hundred different answers. The word has been connected with every kind of attribute from the most abstract ideal to the most trivial mannerism. It means so much that it means nothing.

However, certain similarities can be observed with sufficient regularity to allow a classification of the various definitions of Americanism under three general headings: (1) definitions in terms of political, educational, and economic institutions; (2) definitions in terms of ideals considered characteristically American; and (3) definitions in terms of participation in certain activities, such as patriotic demonstrations or voting.

A good example of the definitions grouped under the first heading is found in the statement made by Professor John R. Commons: "I can think of no comprehensive and concise description equal to that of Abraham Lincoln: 'Government of the people, by the people, for the people.' This description should be applied not only to State but to other institutions. In the home it means equality of husband and wife; in the church it means the voice of the laity; in industry the participation of the workman."¹

A somewhat more specific definition designates as distinctively American traits the following: "Private property, parliamentary democracy, evangelical Christianity and the monogamic home."² A still more ambitious attempt to enumerate the qualities of Americanism results in a long list: Conscientious integrity, free speech, continental isolation, rotation in office, no third term for the President, free education, local-unit public schools, private business

¹Commons, John R., *Races and Immigrants in America*, p. 213.

²"The Failure of the Melting Pot," *The Nation*, January 24, 1920.

corporations, a small standing army, social equalization, union of states, and free vocational choice.³

These definitions and characterizations show what is perhaps the most widely accepted idea of Americanism. The terms used are vague, but not so vague as to be quite meaningless. They correspond here and there to certain realities discoverable in American life.

Under the second of the three headings mentioned, the descriptions of Americanism are phrased in terms so indefinite that one can only guess at the meaning intended by the authors. This indefiniteness may be the natural result of attempts to epitomize Americanism in its complex entirety in a few sentences or even with a single word. An illustration of the latter is found in the statement that "Americanism means 'square deal'."⁴ A prominent writer on the subject says, "To sum up Americanism in one word, it is self-determination."⁵ Another writer finds "humanitarianism" to be the distinguishing feature of Americanism.⁶ Still another says, "Americanism is one of the fine arts, the finest of the fine arts, the art of getting along peaceably with all sorts and conditions of men."⁷

Other examples of this type are somewhat less sparing with words. They present lists of traits which, taken together, are assumed to constitute Americanism. One list, the correlative of "fine-arts Americanism," includes three traits: cosmopolitanism, catholicity, and eclecticism. A wholly different set of characters is emphasized in the following: "Surely the thing most to be desired in an American is patriotism, linked with an alert, self-reliant efficiency,

³Kilpatrick, Van Everie, "Americanization Through School Gardens," *Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association*, 1918, pp. 174-5.

⁴Cody, Frank, "What One Representative American City is Doing in Teaching Americanism," *Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association*, 1921, pp. 759-64.

⁵Burns, Allen T., *American Americanization*, p. 5.

⁶Blayney, Lindsey, "American Ideals and Traditions," *North American Review*, May, 1922.

⁷Slosson, Edwin E., "What is Americanism?" *Independent*, March 20, 1920.

intellectual idealism and a love of law-abiding liberty."⁸ Still other American traits are brought out in this enumeration: liberty and self-reliance, union and coöperation, democracy and the square deal, internationalism and brotherhood.⁹ Hugo Münsterberg sees Americanism manifesting itself as the spirit of self-assertion, of self-initiative, of self-direction, and of self-perfection.¹⁰

Definitions falling under the third heading of our classification are less frequently encountered. They are usually expressed only when the Americanism of particular groups is brought into question. The spokesmen of the suspected groups then insist that they have shown themselves true Americans by joining the army or by taking out first papers or by subscribing to the Liberty Loan in excess of their quota. From this point of view, Americanism means conformity to a minimum requirement of patriotic or civic duties. Except for its greater concreteness, this description is as inadequate as the two preceding.

It is only by the exercise of utmost restraint that one keeps from making sport of this conglomerate array of Americanisms. One wonders if their creators were serious or if they were laughing up their sleeves all the while. Some of their productions are absurd almost to the point of ludicrousness.

The chief objection to them is their failure to describe characteristics actually possessed by the American people. They are more nearly descriptions of what ought ideally to be than of what really is. They disregard individuals entirely and speak of the "people," as if the people could have attributes distinct and separate from the attributes of individuals. Obviously the group can have no traits not demonstrable in its separate members.

IV

This lack of objectivity and agreement in our ideas as to

⁸"The New Americanism," *American Review of Reviews*, June, 1919.

⁹Bogardus, Emory S., *Essentials of Americanization*.

¹⁰Münsterberg, Hugo, *The Americans*, tr. by Edwin B. Holt.

what constitutes Americanism is mainly responsible for our inability to formulate and agree upon an Americanization policy. Uncertain generalities provide no sound basis for the working out of practical methods. How shall we inculcate "self-determination" in the immigrant; or how supply him with the proper amount of "conscientious integrity" and a "love of law-abiding liberty"?

Even if we could devise a method there would be no way in which we could test its success or failure. We have no measure for "humanitarianism" or the "square deal." We could not know but that our method was producing results exactly opposite to those intended.

But we cannot let the matter rest in its present uncertainty. Our national welfare is too important to be left indefinitely to chance developments. There are questions to be answered, problems to be solved. Why, for instance, are some emigrants apparently more easily Americanized than others? Is it due to differences of race, culture, or the size of the foreign group in America? Is it due to the social distance maintained by the various classes in our society? Or is it due to some factor or factors as yet undiscovered? What will be the result of the operation of our latest immigration law? Do our restrictions really select the best from among the many who apply for admittance?

We cannot answer these questions in our present state of ignorance. Writers and orators cannot help us. A reading of the voluminous literature on the subject adds more confusion than enlightenment. It is time to try the very obvious method of looking for Americanism in the Americans themselves.

Such a method will have little use for the generalities and abstractions so frequently found in books on Americanism. It will base its reports on facts discovered by an actual examination of Americans. These facts will consist of lists of traits found in Americans, stated in terms as concrete as possible. In order to compensate for individual differences and to secure representative results, the number to be examined and the manner of their selection must be determined by the rules of statistics.

To be of any considerable value the investigation must extend to countries other than our own. The word "Americanization" sets us off against the rest of the world. It calls attention to contrasts, real or imagined, between Americans and others; it implies that there is something unique and distinctive about Americans. What these distinctions are can be determined only by comparing the results of objective studies of the people of other countries with results obtained from similar studies made in America. Such a comparison will give us a true picture of Americanism, that is, of the group of traits in which Americans rank high as compared with the people of other nations.

This does not mean, of course, that a particular trait must be entirely absent among other peoples in order legitimately to be called American. Speaking English, for example, is undoubtedly an American trait, although shared with England, Australia, and South Africa. Similarly, the comparison might show that a high divorce rate is an American trait, though an almost equally high rate prevails in Japan. But such a trait as patriotism, in so far as it is manifested by deeds and professions, would probably be found in equal degree among many non-American peoples. It could not, therefore, be fairly considered a part of Americanism.

Needless to say, we have few studies of the kind suggested, either in America or in foreign countries. The decennial census gives us a good deal of information, but when compared with similar investigations made in other countries, shows nothing distinctively American. Some studies of incomes indicate that a high standard of living is an American trait, but here also the differences are not significant. More than likely the more conspicuous Americanisms will be found to be cultural traits, and of these almost no objective studies have been undertaken.

When we shall have completed the necessary investigation and thus learned what Americanism really is, we may attack the problem of Americanization. It may be that we shall be less enthusiastic about it when all the facts are at hand. Some of our traits, a high murder rate and grafts

in officialdom, for instance, may be positively bad. Many others, such as the simultaneous donning of straw hats in spring or our all-engrossing interest in baseball scores, may be of no importance whatever. Probably we shall find a comparatively small number of traits which will need to be taken into account by an Americanization plan.

With the formulation of such a plan this paper is not concerned. We have so little of the knowledge necessary to the making of a plan that we can at best offer only suggestions. We must remember, for example, the principle of interaction, the possibility, say, of our being Italianized by the very people whom we are trying to Americanize. And we must remember that an appeal to the prestige motive will bring results quicker than coercion. Beyond a few such generalities we cannot go. The development of a scientific Americanization method awaits the accumulation and interpretation of facts, and this will come only with the adoption of the objective method.

V

It remains now for us to illustrate this method of studying Americanization by showing how it works in actual practice. Although, as indicated, studies of this kind have been few, we have fortunately an excellent example in the work of Professor Julius Drachsler on *Intermarriage in New York City*. In this work Professor Drachsler gives the results of an investigation of 100,000 marriages which took place in New York City during the five-year period of 1908-12. On the basis of information secured from the marriage records, the relative number of intermarriages between the various races, nationalities, and linguistic groups was determined. The data were also classified so as to show the differences in rate between men and women, between the first and second generations, and among the several occupational divisions. These differences are shown in numerical and percentage tables, which afford the means of easy and accurate comparison.

According to the argument of Professor Drachsler, intermarriage is one of the most reliable evidences of Americanization. It indicates a common language, social and economic equality, cultural likenesses and the breakdown of group solidarity. It means that the immigrant and his descendants have accepted as desirable and have already acquired many traits of a group different from their own. A willingness to intermarry with another race or nationality may well be taken to prove that a willingness to enter into all the less intimate relationships of life has become well established. The rate of intermarriage may, therefore, be taken as an index of Americanization.

In the application of such an index the unaccountable factors of prejudice and personal feeling cannot enter to affect the result. Are the Greeks assimilable? The answer will appear in plain figures, showing exactly where this group stands in relation to others found under the same conditions. Furthermore, the extent to which the Americanism of the children of immigrants exceeds that of their parents can be stated in numerical terms. The economic levels at which Americanization proceeds most rapidly can be shown by the variations in the number of intermarriages among the various occupational groups.

When such information becomes available it will be possible to discover the variations in rate between different sections of the country, between different cities, between the city and the country. As yet we are in almost total ignorance of such differences as may exist. A study begun by the writer seems to indicate that assimilation is slower in the country than in the city. This conclusion is based on a study of 1,061 marriages of Swedes in Texas, among which there were 118 intermarriages. This makes a rate of approximately 11 per cent, which is about 20 per cent lower than the rate found by Professor Drachsler for the Swedes of New York City and 2.5 per cent lower than the rate for the New York City population at large.

Of course it would be presumptuous to draw final conclusions as to the relative assimilating power of the city

and the country from such meager evidence. There may be differences between the Swedish group of Texas more important in the process of assimilation than is their place of residence. It is possible, for instance, that the two groups represent different types, selected and segregated by the environment. The highly social or gregarious person may be attracted to the city, while the conservative individual goes to the farm. Thus the differences responsible for their choice of residence may also enter as factors affecting the number of intermarriages contracted. There are many other possible reasons for the difference in the rate, none of which can be more than surmised, but one thing, at least, is indicated, namely, that the rate of assimilation is not altogether a matter of race difference, as has been so frequently assumed.

Of course, it is not argued that the rate of intermarriage is the only factor which needs to be taken into account in studying the rate of assimilation. There are many other characteristics which may be studied from the objective point of view and reduced to quantitative terms. From among these we may take, as a second illustration, the change which occurs in the "given" or "Christian" names among immigrant groups in America.

Everyone has observed, superficially, at least, the tendency of the foreign-born to give their children American names. That this tendency is good evidence of Americanization can scarcely be questioned. It shows, first, that the parents have made a sufficient number of contacts to learn these names, and, second, that they regard them as acceptable and desirable. It is a voluntarily expressed preference for the ways of the adopted country. All normal parents want to give their children the best they know. Therefore, when Guieseppe names his son Frank, we may be sure that Guieseppe is at heart a true American.

To show how this tendency may be studied, the writer has made a comparison between names from the Swedish

group of Texas and names of students in the State University. The number of foreign-born and children of foreign-born in Texas is comparatively small and the proportion of these in the University is probably much smaller than that of the general population. It may be assumed, therefore, that the student body comes very near being a typical American group and that the names of these students can be accepted as a basis for comparison to show the extent of Americanization in other groups.

Five hundred names of men students, chosen at random from the student directory of the University of Texas, were compiled for use as a standard list of American names. Lists of 100 names each, also chosen at random, were secured from the first, second, and third generations of the Swedish group, excluding the names of the offspring of intermarriages. Like names were counted in each list as often as they appeared. The extent of similarity between the Swedish names and the American names was determined by a direct comparison of the lists. Names appearing in both the Swedish and the standard list were checked off by pairs, no name being included in more than one pair. The results, stated in the percentage of such duplicate pairs found for each list of Swedish names, were as follows: Names of Swedish immigrants, 35 per cent; names of sons of immigrants, 49 per cent; names of grandsons of immigrants, 67 per cent. A list of 100 names of students, compared with the standard list to show the extent of agreement for a typical American group, showed 73 per cent duplications.

It may be legitimately argued that the numbers taken are too small to justify the obvious conclusion. It is possible, also, that the fashion in names changes with time and therefore should be taken into account. But in spite of these objections, the comparison shows clearly the existence of a tendency toward complete Americanization. The method used illustrates how the tendency may be accurately measured and the results quantitatively stated. By extending the investigation so as to include a number of traits

and several nationalities under various residential and occupational conditions, we shall be able to secure a fairly good idea of the progress of Americanization.

VI

From the briefly sketched illustrations herein presented it will be seen that the objective study of Americanism and Americanization is entirely practicable. These terms have real meaning if we but look for it in the right place, and the right place is not in the writings of the fathers, but among living Americans. From the purely scientific viewpoint such a study will have great value, since it will lead directly to a clearer understanding of the intricate processes of assimilation. But it will be of even greater value to far-sighted Americans who wish to so control our destiny that we may some day actually acquire the personal qualities corresponding to the ideals on whose possession we have been congratulating ourselves for a century and a half.

THE GRANGE AS A POLITICAL FACTOR IN TEXAS

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In introducing a study, however brief, of the local activities of the farmers' organization known as the Grange, it is necessary to call attention briefly to certain of the larger phases of the movement. It must be understood, first, that the Grange was not a localized organization, but that it was the local reflection of a movement nation-wide in its scope and importance; and, second, that the Grange as such was not an isolated incident, but that it was properly considered one phase of a great "Agrarian Crusade" which swept the country during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Hence, although this paper is dedicated to the task of examining the influence of the Grange as a political factor in Texas, it will be profitable to digress somewhat and to note briefly something of the nature of the farmers' crusade in its entirety.¹

The agrarian unrest existent throughout the United States during the last quarter of the nineteenth century was due immediately to certain well-defined causes and factors which combined to react in a way unfavorable to agriculture and agriculturists the country over. The farmers were confronted with very real and practical problems, upon the solution of which depended to a considerable extent the prosperity of the agricultural classes. Certain other classes were concerned in working out the same problems; but none of these were as vitally interested as the farmers, whose very existence was bound up inextricably with the remedying of ills and the ameliorating of conditions known to workmen in general and to the farmers in particular. These

¹Solon J. Buck gives what is probably the clearest, most succinct survey of the movement for organization and coöperation among the farmers in his book entitled *The Agrarian Crusade* (New Haven, 1920).

conditions were largely economic in nature, although in certain sections the farmers were disgruntled with the political situation. The railroads, for example, brought with them certain problems, in the solution of which the agricultural classes were vitally interested. The discontent everywhere evident is proof sufficient that the farmers were far from satisfied with the situation brought about by the railroads and their relations with the various State governments. Again, while the prices of agricultural supplies and necessities advanced steadily, those of farm produce remained stationary, or, in some cases, even declined. This constituted a ground of complaint which was capitalized to the fullest extent by the farmers' organizations. Thirdly, there was the whole question of the currency. The farmers naturally enough wanted more instead of less money, and they directed their energies toward carrying their point here. There were other "sore spots" which contributed to the discontent of the agricultural classes: the tariff demanded an adjustment, from the point of view of the farmer especially; the question of reconstruction was a grave one; and, in the South, at least, the negro problem was one which weighed heavily upon the shoulders of the farmer. All these problems contributed their bit to the ever-growing tide of discontent among the agriculturists, a tide which issued finally in a great movement for organization and co-operation known as the Agrarian Crusade.

The Agrarian Crusade was ushered in with the organization of the Grange, an order which was professedly non-political in character, but which nevertheless managed to call the attention of both State and National Governments to its demands in such a way that they were not to be denied. Following the Grange and accepting its financial teachings in good part was the Greenback Party, which championed the cause of the agricultural classes in political campaigns until the early eighties, when the movement began definitely to subside. Both of these organizations gained concessions for the farmers, but even as the Greenback cause declined it became evident that the reforms brought

about by the early agrarian agitators had not been as thorough-going as the farmers desired. With the realization of this fact went the conviction that further reforms and concessions should be demanded; hence a new representative of the agricultural classes was not long in taking shape. The Farmers' Alliance assumed form slowly during the early eighties, and by the latter part of the decade was able to step into the breach left by the demise of the Greenback Party. The Alliance, like the Grange fifteen years previous, was professedly a non-political organization; but, also like the Grange, it was possessed of a tremendous strength as a political factor. Nevertheless, its leaders refused to participate in political campaigns in the name of the order, and the People's Party was organized in 1890-92 with the principles of the Alliance incorporated in its platform. The earlier organization gave way to Populism, and the agricultural classes united in support of Populist candidates, many of whom were elected. The party came to an untimely end when, in 1896, the Democratic Party incorporated the Populist platform into its own, accepting almost in their entirety the principles announced by the People's Party. The capture of the Democratic Party may be looked upon as the ultimate political triumph of the Agrarian Crusade, since by that fact that farmers were guaranteed actual consideration for their demands.

The passing of Populism brought to an end the crusade of the farmers, a movement which had been in progress for a quarter of a century. Various other organizations have come into existence since 1900, but there has been no definite, clear-cut movement such as that which swept the country during the latter part of the nineteenth century.² The twenty-five years from 1875 to 1900 are unique in American politics, for they witnessed a phenomenon which

²An exception must be noted in the case of the Farm Bureau movement, which has gained great momentum during the last decade. The Farm Bureau undoubtedly wields a great power in politics, although it is not possible at this time to measure accurately the importance of its activities.

is without parallel in the history of the country. Four great movements arose in turn in protest against the economic (and in some cases the political) system under which the agricultural classes labored. The four were essentially related. Although each differed from the others in organization, and, to some extent, at least, in statement of principles and policies, all had the same ultimate end, to gain privileges and concessions for the farmers whenever and wherever possible. Thus the four are considered as but parts of the great movement evident of the general feeling of agricultural discontent throughout the period and known popularly as the Agrarian Crusade.

From these considerations it is fairly evident that no one of the four movements which constitute the Agrarian Crusade may be studied properly as complete in and of itself. Nevertheless, if it be kept in mind that the four are inseparably related, it may prove profitable to give individual attention to each. The Grange in particular lends itself to separate examination. In the first place, it was the movement which introduced the Agrarian Crusade, and therefore merits special consideration. In the second place, while it cannot be separated from its successor, the line of demarcation between the two is sufficiently plain to permit such consideration without a great deal of loss or inconvenience. In the third place, the accomplishments of the Grange and the results of Grange organization, while not always clearly evident, are reasonably definite in character, and thus may be noted with a fair degree of accuracy. It would seem, therefore, that we may discuss the political consequences of the Granger movement in Texas with a reasonable assurance that the results to be considered are those, directly or indirectly, of the activities of the Grange in the State.

The order known as the Patrons of Husbandry, or, more familiarly, the Grange, was founded in 1867, the national organization preceding the local.³ Its founder, O. H. Kelley,

³For a history of the origin and development of the Grange, see Buck, *The Granger Movement* (Cambridge, 1913).

a clerk in the Agricultural Bureau at Washington, conceived the idea while traveling through the South on an official mission in 1866. Kelley was struck by the apathy of the farmers generally, and by the universal economic depression among the agricultural classes; and he returned to Washington determined to devise some scheme which would assist the farmer in meeting the new and strange problems which confronted him. His idea took form in 1867 with the founding of the Grange, his associates in the venture being some half-a-dozen government clerks. A well-directed publicity campaign coupled with Kelley's perseverance served to tide the organization over the initial lean period, and within three or four years the Grange was known throughout the length and breadth of the agricultural section.

The Grange reached Texas in 1873 with the establishment of a subordinate grange at Salado, in Bell County. Thenceforward, the movement gained momentum rapidly throughout the State, so that by April, 1874, 360 granges had been founded. In the meantime, the Texas State Grange had been organized,⁴ although its organization was not perfected until a meeting of April 14, 1874.⁵ The State Grange grew and prospered, until, at the peak of the movement in 1876 and 1877,⁶ it boasted a membership of 45,000, of whom 6,000 were women. A period of decline set in immediately thereafter, and the State Grange lost heavily and steadily in membership. At no subsequent date did it approach the 40,000 mark; and, although it was granted a brief respite in the early eighties, the reawakening of interest was only temporary. As an organization of statewide interest and importance, the order was of little

⁴*Proceedings of the First Annual Session of the Texas State Grange, 1873.*

⁵*Ibid.*, 1874.

⁶The Grange was already losing strength rapidly as a national organization, but it must be remembered that the order was introduced into the State at a late date, and that it was therefore some years behind the National Grange in getting a foothold and in reaching its period of maximum strength.

influence after 1880, and after 1885 it was rarely referred to, even in a casual way, by contemporary writers.

The purposes of the Grange, as stated by its officers, may be summed up under three heads.⁷ In the first place, the home life of the members was to be given a new meaning by the activities of the order. In the second place, social intercourse was to be fostered and encouraged, with the idea that such association would be of mutual benefit. In the third place, the members of the Grange were to gain certain advantages through new methods of dealing with the business world. Among the chief of these new weapons was agricultural coöperation, which was enthusiastically adopted by the farmers. It will be noted that the objects as stated above do not include participation, either direct or indirect, in politics. In fact, the leaders of the order were at some pains to explain that the Grange must not be dragged into politics; and a penalty was set upon any subordinate grange which might attempt to capitalize the name of the Grange as a political weapon. Members were permitted, nay, encouraged, to take an active part in politics, but it was in their capacity as citizens that they were to do this, and not as Grangers.⁸

It was on this very point that the Grange and its critics disagreed, officers of the order urging Grangers throughout the State to engage actively in politics, even to the extent of announcing for office if this became necessary to secure the interests of the farmers. In recommending such action as a final recourse, they distinguished between the Granger as a private citizen, who might in this capacity participate in political campaigns, and the Granger as such, who was pledged to keep the order free from the partisan smirch. The critics of the Grange, on the other hand, made no such

⁷The objects of the Grange were discussed in every newspaper of the time. They were also the subject of the Worthy Master's annual address for the first two or three sessions of the State Grange.

⁸No political test was applied to candidates for membership in the Grange. On the contrary, men of any and all parties were welcomed, and their activities as Grangers in no way interfered with their political allegiance.

distinction. It was impossible for them to see how a member of the Grange might run for office without using, to some extent at least, his influence as a Granger. Hence, when the farmer leaders advanced the idea, as they did time and again, that the agricultural classes should be represented in the legislative branches of the Government,⁹ the opponents of the Grange seized the opportunity to raise the cry that the order was marshaling its forces as a political party. The aid of the press was enlisted in these efforts to discredit the Grange, and newspapers throughout the State were almost fanatical in their denunciation of secret political intrigue—usually without waiting to ascertain the truth of the rumors on which their accusations were based. It must be added that occasionally these attacks found some justification in fact, although more often nothing came of the rumored political activities of the Grange.

A great majority of the charges brought by those who feared the Grange were directed against William W. Lang, Worthy Master of the Texas State Grange. Lang was a college graduate and a successful farmer, and was very popular personally over the State; but his position as head of the Grange made him especially liable to attack by its enemies. He was looked upon as the logical candidate of the order for political office; the politicians of the established party saw in him the leader of a potentially powerful rival party, and they questioned his every action. Indeed, the Worthy Master found it impossible to avoid politics altogether. As early as 1874 and 1875 he was mentioned as a possible candidate for Governor, and was forced publicly to disclaim any desire to stand for election for that office. Again, in the latter year, a movement was inaugurated to name the Worthy Master candidate for Congress from the Fourth District, and again the boom collapsed with his refusal to allow himself to be nominated. In the spring elections of 1876, Lang was brought forward as a candidate for a place in the State Legislature, and in this instance he allowed his friends to nominate him. He

⁹*Waco Daily Examiner*, July 8, 1874; *Proceedings*, 1880, p. 18.

was elected, serving thus in the first legislature to meet under the new Constitution.¹⁰ A storm of protest arose at once, and the Worthy Master was denounced on every hand for having dragged the Grange into politics in spite of the numerous protests against his candidacy.¹¹

From 1876 to 1878 Lang's possibilities as a gubernatorial candidate were discussed in full by the newspapers of the State, the discussion serving to keep the name of the Grange leader in the public mind. By the latter date, the voters throughout the State had become accustomed to think of the Worthy Master as a possible candidate, and were not unprepared when, in May, 1878, the *Examiner* suggested him as the best man available for the office. In answer to inquiry from the press, Lang declared that he was a Democrat in politics, and that he would be governed by the action of the Democratic State Convention. The Convention, which met at Austin in July, 1878, failed to view his candidacy in a favorable light;¹² and, true to his promise, the Grange leader refused to make the race as an Independent. After this time, agitation both for and against the candidacy

¹⁰The Constitution, framed in the fall of 1875, was adopted February 15, 1876.

¹¹It is altogether probable that other Grangers were elected to serve in the State Legislature during this period; but, inasmuch as legislators were reported as Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, and not as representatives of the Grange, it is impossible to determine whether or not this was the case. It is interesting to note, however, that the Legislature during the time when the Grange was thriving contained a distinct agrarian element. Indeed, one-half of the legislators were farmers ordinarily, and sometimes an even greater per cent were engaged in agricultural pursuits; and it is no more than reasonable to suppose that a considerable number of these farmer legislators were also Grangers.

¹²Worthy Master Lang was put forward for nomination, but his name was withdrawn after several ballots had emphasized the futility of his candidacy. When twenty-seven ballots had been cast and no nomination made, a compromise candidate was brought forward in the person of O. M. Roberts, and he was nominated by acclamation. For an account of the convention, see the *Daily Democratic Statesman* (Austin), July 18-25, 1878.

of the Worthy Master subsided, and the Grange was left to pursue its course in comparative peace.

Such, in brief, is an outline of the activities of the Grange in Texas in so far as actual participation in politics is concerned, and in so far as such participation can be measured accurately.¹³ The leaders of the order were apparently sincere in their desire to maintain its nonpartisan character, but in this they were only partly successful. Worthy Master Lang especially drew constant criticism to the Grange by his interest in political campaigns, although there is every reason to believe that he was innocent of any design on the good faith of his order. He proclaimed himself a Democrat in the political world, and was never over-anxious to accept a nomination tendered him. Nevertheless, his activities carried him into politics more than once, and on these occasions he was generally looked upon as the candidate of the Grange. True, that order did not put him forward formally as its candidate; but it is hardly to be doubted that the Worthy Master controlled a goodly portion of his following, not as a Democrat or an Independent, but as a Granger. The opponents of the order emphasized Lang's dual position, and their attacks served to discredit both the Grange and its leader. Thus, whatever the private motives of Worthy Master Lang, his activities compromised the Grange and contributed to its untimely decline.

Although the Grange took part, through its leaders, in the politics of the State during the latter seventies, it was not in actual participation in politics that the order manifested its greatest strength. Had the Grange contented itself with the campaign of its leader in 1878, it would indeed have exercised some influence politically; but the

¹³Attention has been called to the fact that no detailed study of the complexion of the Legislature with regard to the Grange is possible. The discussion is thus necessarily limited to the Granger candidates whose cases were noted in particular by contemporary journals and newspapers. Of these candidates, the Worthy Master himself was the subject of by far the greater part of the controversies.

order is remembered today, not for Lang's term in the State Legislature or his unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic nomination for Governor, but for what it accomplished in a practical way. The accomplishments of the Grange are measured in good part by legislative enactment, brought about through its influence upon the Legislature of the State.

The Legislature was constantly reminded of the desires and needs of the farmers in various ways. At almost every session of the State Grange a committee on memorials was appointed, whose sole duty it was to prepare a list of grievances of the agricultural classes and to suggest ways and means of redressing those grievances. The list was referred first to the Grange convention; after it had been examined and approved by that body it was presented to the Legislature in the form of a memorial. Such memorials, together with additional resolutions and petitions, were voted on regularly and sent to the Legislature, and some even were addressed directly to Congress. Again, committees were appointed on occasion to present the case of the farmers before the Legislature, and officers of the Grange were commissioned to appear before various legislative committees as attorneys for the order. These proceedings were placed before the people by Grange lecturers, and through the speeches of the officers of the order, which were reproduced in the annual *Proceedings* and in the official organ of the Grange, the *Daily Examiner*. Newspaper discussions and debates also assisted in educating the public to the Grange program, even though many of these were based on false or inaccurate reports and ideas. In these ways a tremendous influence was brought to bear upon the Legislature. That body had a great respect for the Grange, and justly so, for it is not improbable that the order numbered among its members and friends at least half of the voting population of the State. Texas was, during the last quarter of the last century, preponderantly agricultural in its interests; and the agricultural classes, whether avowedly Granger or not, were influenced by the same factors,

factors making for seeming inequality and oppression of those classes. Hence, when the farmers spoke, as they frequently did, through the Grange and its agents, their demands and suggestions were at least given respectful attention, and usually some positive action was taken by way of alleviating the conditions complained of.

During the seventies, the memorials of the Grange to the Legislature most often took the form of complaints against the railroads. Discrimination in the form of rebates, passes, varying rate schedules for long and short hauls, and exorbitant freight rates formed the bases for these complaints; and the farmers proposed to have their ills and those of the railroads examined into by the Legislature. As early as 1874 warnings of the conflict were sounded by the leaders of the Grange, and in 1875 the situation was discussed openly and plainly. The annual address of the Worthy Master for that year gives the farmers' side of the question in no uncertain terms. Attention was called to the "fearful rate of freights" charged by the railroads;¹⁴ and the regulation of monopolies by law was declared to be a necessity, railroads, of course, being classed as monopolies. Of special significance is the following statement: Railroads are by their very nature monopolies, and have a power over the public to make unjust demands *unless restrained by legislative control*. The master allowed the claim that the railroads were "vested rights," but continued that "when vested rights become public tyrannies, it is high time for them to be regulated, not destroyed, by the necessary laws and constitutional enactments of a free people."¹⁵ Lang, and the Grange as a whole, for that matter, far from condemning the railroads, recognized their value to the farmer, and gave them full credit for unlimited possibilities in developing the State. What the Worthy Master and the Grange did want, however, was regulation of the railroads in such a way as to provide for fair schedules of

¹⁴*Proceedings*, 1875, p. 13.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 15.

fares and freights, and the prevention of discrimination and unjust tactics by the railroads and their officials.

Agitation for governmental regulation of the railroads was so pronounced that the Constitutional Convention of 1875 was forced to take cognizance of the situation. This it did in Article X of the Constitution, which deals exclusively with the railroads. Section 2 of the article provides that the Legislature shall pass laws to correct abuses and to prevent discrimination and extortion in the schedule of the railroads. Section 5 forbids the consolidation of parallel or competing lines. The remaining seven sections of the article either make specific provisions for laws to control the railroads, or include enabling clauses by which the Legislature may pass acts deemed just and proper to the accomplishment of that end.

The Fifteenth Legislature, which convened in April, 1876, after the Constitution had been adopted the preceding February, made no attempt to carry through any of the acts which that instrument empowered it to pass. The agitation concerning the railroads, which had died away to an extent with the incorporation of the railroad clauses into the Constitution, became more pronounced than ever. Colonel Jones, Master of the Waco District Grange, complained of the discrimination in freight rates that was still evident despite the constitutional provision that the Legislature should pass laws to regulate these rates.¹⁶ Worthy Master Lang continued his campaign against the unjust practices of the railroads, making speeches over the country in his efforts to obtain favorable legislation for the farmers. In a speech delivered in June, 1878, he said that the railroads were about to obtain complete control over the State; that they were influencing unduly the officers of the State; and that, unless something were done to remedy the existing evils, the Grange would be forced to take a hand in the

¹⁶Colonel Jones made the point that the rate on a bale of cotton from Waco to Galveston was \$4.50, while from Dallas to Galveston, a much greater distance, it was only \$2. *Waco Daily Examiner*, May 15, 1878.

matter.¹⁷

As a result of the protests voiced and the dissatisfaction everywhere evident, the Sixteenth Legislature, which convened in January, 1879, passed a law making 50 cents per hundred pounds the maximum charge for the transportation of freight. The act also prohibited unjust discrimination against persons or towns, and declared that a higher charge to one person than to another for the same services rendered would be taken as *prima facie* evidence of discrimination.¹⁸ The act professed to eliminate discrimination and exorbitant freight rates, but in its results it was far from satisfactory. In 1882, A. J. Rose, who had succeeded Lang as Worthy Master of the Grange, paid his respects to the tactics of the railroads in his addresses, and the Grangers throughout the State supported him in his fight for strict regulation by the Government, just as they had supported their former chief. In his annual address for 1882, he demanded the passage of legislation dealing with the problem, and stated that, although seven years had passed since the adoption of the Constitution, no law regulating freight rates had been passed.¹⁹ In this he quite ignored the act of 1879, which certainly had for its aim the regulation of rates, whether it accomplished its purpose or not. The resident of the Texas Coöperative Association took up the cry, and reported numerous instances of discrimination and exorbitant rates.²⁰ Many other complaints and protests were heard from every part of the State, from the public generally as well as from the agricultural classes.

The effect of these protests is seen in a series of acts passed between 1882 and 1892. Two acts dealing with the railroads were passed by the Seventeenth Legislature in 1882. The first of these purposed to regulate passenger

¹⁷*Daily Democratic Statesman*, June 19, 1878.

¹⁸H. P. N. Gammel, *Laws of Texas* (10 vols., Austin, 1898), VI, p. 185.

¹⁹*Proceedings*, 1882, p. 9.

²⁰*Report of the Texas Coöperative Association*, 1881, p. 14.

fare, providing a maximum rate of 3 cents per mile.²¹ The second prohibited the railroads from making a greater charge for freight than that specified in the bill of lading.²² Both of these acts neglected to inquire into the cause of the evils, and it remained for the Eighteenth Legislature to pass, in 1883, an act elaborating on the principles of the law of 1879.²³ The law of 1883 was still unsatisfactory, and it came to be generally recognized that such a body as the Legislature was not qualified to deal with the problems of railway regulation. The creation of the Railroad Commission at last met the difficulty in a fairly satisfactory way, and it was not until the Commission had been established that the public ceased to protest. As early as 1876, the Grange suggested that some such body should be created to deal with the problem, and from time to time the suggestion was repeated. Several attempts were made to pass a bill establishing a commission, but the railroad lobby proved strong enough to delay favorable action on the question until 1891, when the Railroad Commission Act was passed.

The act of 1891 wrote the final chapter in the history of legislative regulation of railroads in the State. From the very day of its introduction into Texas, the Grange took an active part in insisting upon the correction of abuses practiced by the railroads. Memorials, petitions, and resolutions were presented constantly to the Legislature, and the addresses of the leaders of the Grange made that body appreciate more fully the consequences that might attend a denial of the requests of the order. Hence it is not too

²¹Gammel, *op. cit.*, IX, p. 263.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 295.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 373. The caption of the act follows: "An act to further provide for the regulation of railroad and transportation lines in the State of Texas, and to provide for the creation of the office of, and appointment of a State Engineer and his secretary, and their salaries and duties; to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates charged for transportation of freight and passengers in this State, and to provide a mode of procedure in relation thereto."

much to say that the Grange was very influential in carrying through the earlier laws dealing with the railroad problems, and that it was, both because of its early agitation and because of its active support of reform, one of the most powerful factors in the passage of the law providing for the creation of the Railroad Commission.²⁴

Hand in hand with the Granger agitation against discriminatory practices by the railroads went protests against the operations of trusts and monopolies in general. Influential Grange leaders recognized from the first the fact that trusts and monopolies played a very important part in determining the economic condition of the farmer, and within a year after the introduction of the Grange into Texas they were demanding Government regulation of trusts. Attention has been called to Worthy Master Lang's attitude on monopolies. Grange officials throughout the State were wholehearted in their support of the stand taken by the Worthy Master. Frequent denunciations were hurled at the great business enterprises which, it was charged, threatened by their operations to ruin the agricultural classes. Specifically, the Grange took exception to the activities of the Jute Bagging Trust, and numerous accusations against the Trust were made in the annual Grange conventions. Again, the Galveston Wharf Company was accused of overcharging the farmers for handling and storing cotton, and statistics were introduced by the *Waco Examiner* to show that wharfage duties at Galveston were three times those charged at Boston. Other charges were made, and the *Examiner* was especially zealous in demanding regulation of the company by the Legislature.

The operations of various other big business enterprises

²⁴The Texas State Grange must be given credit also for a part in bringing about the passage of the Federal Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which was a direct result of the joint endeavors of various State Granges throughout the country.

In citing acts of the State Legislature dealing with the railroads, only a few representative laws have been mentioned. Many others were passed, but those selected for reference illustrate best the Legislature's reaction to the demands for railroad regulation.

were noted with disapproval by the Grange leaders, who employed their best weapons to bring about Government regulation of trusts and monopolies. Throughout the later seventies and the whole of the eighties the Legislature was addressed time and again, until at last it became necessary for that body to take positive action. This it did in 1889, passing in that year an act defining trusts, forbidding their existence or operation in Texas, and providing for punishment and penalties for violation of the law.²⁵ Here again, although the act passed in answer to the demands of the Grange became effective only after that order had become impotent in the State, the influence of Grange activities in behalf of trust regulation is not to be denied.

Next to the questionable practices of the railroads and the operations of trusts and monopolies, the Grange protested most bitterly against taxation, and their protests usually took the form of an impeachment of the farm produce tax. The State Comptroller, acting under the advice of the Attorney General, construed the tax law of 1876 to include for assessment agricultural products, and a tax was accordingly laid upon all farm produce.²⁶ Vigorous protests were at once heard from the Grange, and the cry was soon taken up by every farmer in the State. Lang, in his annual address of 1878, attacked the tax as being unwise and unsound, and advised the Grange that steps should be taken at once to look into the matter.²⁷ A committee on produce tax was appointed, and after investigating the situation, it reported that the Constitution did not warrant the levying of a tax on agricultural produce, nor did the Legislature intend that an interpretation providing for such a tax should be read into their act of 1876.²⁸ It was generally agreed that the Comptroller had acted without

²⁵Gammel, *op. cit.*, IX, pp. 1169-1170. It is interesting to note that the act passed both houses without one dissenting vote.

²⁶*Daily Democratic Statesman*, June 25, 1878.

²⁷*Proceedings*, 1878, pp. 10-11.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 50-63. The Grange meeting of 1878 devoted quite a bit of attention to the produce tax. In fact, the greater part of the discussions and debates centered around this question.

constitutional authority, and the executive committee was authorized to memorialize the Legislature to relieve the farmers of the onerous exactions of the produce tax. A similar resolution was adopted in 1879, and the Worthy Master was ordered to present a second memorial to the Legislature and to argue the case of the farmers before the various committees to which the question might be referred.²⁹ So well respected were these memorials that the Sixteenth Legislature, which convened in 1879, passed a joint resolution stating specifically that farm produce is exempt from all taxation.³⁰ In this way were the demands of the Grange regarding the "smokehouse and corncrib" tax answered.

A fourth evil which the Grange called to the attention of the Legislature was the usurious rates of interest charged by the money-lenders. Money of any kind, and especially specie, was scarce in Texas, as in other Southern states, for several years after the war. As a consequence, a man who had money to lend could command almost any rate of interest he cared to ask, and cases were reported where the note on a loan called for from 3 to 6 per cent per month. The legitimate money-lender, and the legitimate borrower as well, were undone by these wildcat practices, and demands were made on every hand for governmental regulation of interest rates. The *Examiner* was especially zealous in presenting the cause of the farmers, but its editor was not alone in speaking for the Grange. Resolution after resolution was drawn up and presented to the Legislature by subordinate granges and by individual members of the order. The result is seen in Article XVI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which set a maximum of 12 per cent per annum on the rate of interest, with a legal rate of 8 per

²⁹*Ibid.*, 1879, p. 37.

³⁰Gammel, *op. cit.*, VIII, p. 1492. The resolution proposed to add a section to Article VIII of the Constitution, the section to become operative immediately and to remain in effect until passed on by the people. It was incorporated into the Constitution by formal amendment as Section 19 of Article VIII.

cent. The Fifteenth Legislature carried out the mandate of the Constitution by passing an act providing for the punishment of usury, usury being defined as a rate of interest higher than that specified by the Constitution.³¹ The safeguards mentioned were fairly satisfactory for a time, but after a few years complaints became audible again. The result of the new evidences of dissatisfaction was a constitutional amendment, proposed by the Twenty-second Legislature and adopted, reducing the maximum rate of interest to 10 and the legal rate to 6 per cent.³²

It is not necessary to speak at any length here of the transportation facilities, or rather the lack of transportation facilities, in the State during the seventies and eighties. A primary problem of the farmer was the marketing of his produce, and the difficulty of marketing was measured largely by the difficulty or ease with which farm produce might be transported to market. Hence the farmer was intensely interested in every project to increase the facilities for transportation, and his representative, the Grange, did everything in its power to accomplish that end. The railroads have been mentioned in sufficient detail elsewhere; here it might be recalled simply that a fairly efficient system of railway transportation was in operation in the State by 1880. A problem second only to the railroads was that of providing an outlet by water for farm produce. Such an outlet, it was believed, would increase materially the value of Texas crops, inasmuch as it would furnish the farmer with a means of dealing directly with the Eastern and foreign markets, and would in addition furnish a bit of competition for the railroads. The Grange then supported every move to secure to Texas a deep water harbor on the Gulf, and was itself the originator of several such moves. Worthy Master Lang, in his annual address of 1878, pointed out the advantages to be gained from a harbor that might receive deep sea vessels, and recommended

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 1063-1064.

³²*Ibid.*, X, p. 89.

that the Grange memorialize the Senate of the United States to grant to Texas the benefits of a foreign and Eastern trade.³³ The memorial was duly prepared and presented to the Senate, and the Grange continued to prepare petitions and to assist in getting out propaganda in favor of a deep water harbor. The Seventeenth Legislature, taking a leaf from the history of developments in the State, passed a joint resolution setting forth substantially the points made previously by the Grange, and instructing the State's Representatives and Senators to urge the passage of a bill giving to Texas a deep water harbor at the port of Galveston. The resolution also provided that the Governors of other States interested in a water outlet through Texas should be notified of the action taken and requested to consider the project.³⁴ The Eighteenth Legislature also passed resolutions, one pertaining to Sabine Pass,³⁵ and another to Galveston,³⁶ requesting the Representatives and Senators of the State to use their influence to secure deep water at those places. The Nineteenth Legislature followed the example of its predecessors, and passed resolutions pertaining to a deep water harbor.³⁷ All this while the Grange was passing resolutions regularly, and these resolutions could not have been without their effect on the Legislature.

In addition to these few primary problems, there were a number of issues on which the Grange took a very decided stand, and thereby gave a political tone to the declarations of principles of the order. The first of these, the tariff question, called forth some remarkable denunciations from the Grange. At every meeting of the order the tariff was brought up for discussion, and many memorials were addressed to Congress calling for an adjustment of the tariff schedules. Another question which interested

³³*Proceedings*, 1878, pp. 66-67.

³⁴Gammel, *op. cit.*, IX, pp. 217-218.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 607-608.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 608.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 748. For the action of the Twenty-first Legislature, see pp. 1202-1203.

the Grange was that of immigration. A committee on immigration was appointed from year to year, and active steps were taken to induce farmers from other States and from foreign countries as well to settle in Texas, either as independent farmers or as farm laborers. Immigration societies and companies were formed; Worthy Master Lang resigned as head of the Grange to become president of one of these, the South Western Immigration Company. The immigration question and the active support of practically unlimited immigration by the Grange had, of course, its influence in a political way, inasmuch as the State Legislature was interested in the same question. The policy of the Grange with regard to manufactures in Texas was another phase of the order's activities which often led it into dealings with the Legislature. The committee on memorials worked overtime in preparing petitions requesting legislative support of local manufacturing enterprises; and, although the lawmakers were in favor of the development of local manufactures, they seem never to have seen the need for active interference in this field. The financial problems likewise called forth some very decided opinions from the Grange; and the Greenback Party later gave these opinions due publicity in its campaigns, both State and National.

In these various fields of action did the Grange make its influence felt in a political way. The order called for Government regulation of railroads and other trusts and monopolies, and such regulation was forthcoming; it protested against the produce tax, and the tax was removed; it demanded a law against usury, and a maximum rate-of-interest law was passed; it favored a deep water harbor for Texas, and such a harbor was eventually provided for; it objected to a protective tariff, and memorial after memorial was addressed to Congress in behalf of a tariff for revenue only; and it took such a stand for immigration and for home manufactures that the Legislature was given little opportunity to overlook these questions. The influence of the Grange may not, of course, always be measured directly, for other factors must be taken into consideration.

It is a significant fact, however, that almost every question raised by the order was settled in a way favorable to the farmer. Memorials, petitions, resolutions, addresses, and speeches, votes of approval of favorable and of disapproval of unfavorable acts—all these were listened to with great respect by the public at large, and it was indeed a strong Legislature that was not influenced to a considerable extent by these manifestations from the farmers' "party."

NOTE ON MODIFICATIONS IN THE TEXAS STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CONTRACT

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A fire insurance policy consists of the main contract of a general nature used to cover all fire risks, and one or more amending clauses to make the contract fit the conditions of the specific risk. In so far as the terms of the contract are concerned, the buyer of fire insurance in any of the United States obtains a standardized article, prescribed and controlled by the Legislature or by officers in charge of the regulation of insurance. State governments have control over insurance because the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that insurance is not to be regarded as an article of commerce. The Legislature of Texas has given to the State Insurance Commission the power to make, promulgate, and establish uniform policies of insurance and to prescribe all standard forms, clauses, and indorsements used on or in connection with insurance policies.¹

In 1873 Massachusetts adopted a standard contract, and in 1880 made its use compulsory. In 1887 a standard policy was required in New York, and many other States have since adopted it with or without modifications. It thereafter became the practice of the leading companies to use the New York form in any State where no law prohibited. In 1916 the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners adopted a revision of the New York policy and recommended it for use in all the States. It was expected that the new form would be generally adopted. Some States took it intact; others, including New York, modified it somewhat. The arrangement of the new form is a great improvement over the old; although the meaning is generally the same, there are a few differences. Probably on account of these intended differences and the possibility of the courts making

¹*Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, Articles 4888 and 4889.*

new interpretations where either the order of words and sentences, or sentence structure, was changed, some States, *e.g.*, Ohio, which use the New York standard contract, cling to the old form.

In Texas the State Insurance Commission prescribes a policy patterned after the former New York policy but altered to harmonize with laws which have been passed by the Legislature. It is the purpose of this article to indicate briefly the nature of these changes and their significance.

(1). *In case of a total loss to a building the face of the policy must be paid.* Under the New York form the liability of the insurance company is limited to the "actual cash value of the property at the time any loss or damage occurs . . . with proper deduction for depreciation, however caused." This conflicts with the valued policy law passed by the Legislature of Texas in 1879, which provides: "A fire insurance policy, in case of a total loss by fire of property insured, shall be held and considered to be a liquidated demand against the company for the full amount of such policy. The provisions of this article shall not apply to personal property."² Consequently, the policy has been changed to read: "In case there be a total loss by fire of any real property insured by this policy, as to such real property so totally destroyed, if a liability shall exist hereunder for such loss, it shall be held and considered, subject to the terms of this policy legally applicable, to be a liquidated demand under Article 4874, *Revised Civil Statutes of Texas*, against this company for the full amount hereof covering such real estate." In the absence of fraud a building insured for \$20,000, if totally destroyed by fire, will yield its owner an indemnity of \$20,000, although its true value may be but \$18,000. The burden of watching the valuation is placed upon the insurance company. There are relatively few total losses. The chief added cost is for inspection to check values, which must be done for each piece of property that is insured. The premium charged must be sufficient to cover all costs.

²*Revised Civil Statutes of Texas*, 1925, Article 4929.

(2). *The existence of a lien on property does not invalidate the insurance.* Under the New York form the policy is void if the property is personal property which is or becomes encumbered by a chattel mortgage. In Texas such a provision is null and void.³ The Texas rule simplifies the negotiation of loans based on commodities. The owner of a commodity can mortgage it without invalidating his insurance. It is a protection to the lender. On the other hand, it increases the hazard of the insurance company. The insurer assumes some moral hazard when property belongs entirely to the owner, and far more when it is mortgaged. The company would greatly prefer a clause that required the insured to notify it and get its permission for the continuation of the insurance in every case where personal property becomes encumbered with a mortgage.

(3). *Unless a breach of condition or provision of a policy on personal property contributes to the destruction of the property, it does not invalidate the policy.* If improper installation of electric wiring is a violation of a condition of a policy, the insurance under the New York form is invalidated whatever the cause of a fire. In Texas the policy remains good unless the bad wiring contributed to the fire.⁴ The following clause is inserted: "In so far as and to the extent that any of the warranties, conditions, or provisions are legally subject to and controlled by the Act of the Thirty-third Legislature, Chapter 105, no breach or violation thereof by the assured shall render this policy void, unless such breach or violation contributed to bring about the destruction of the property."

(4). *The time limit for the prosecution of claims is extended.* In order to conform to the statute of limitations,⁵ the policy is changed to read that a suit to enforce a claim under the policy can be brought any time within two years and one day (instead of within twelve months) next after the fire. The requirement for immediate proof of loss is

³*Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, Article 4890.*

⁴*Ibid.*, Article 4930.

⁵*Ibid.*, Article 5526.

omitted, and the time for filing a proof of loss is changed from sixty to ninety-one days.

(5). *Who is an agent?* A Texas statute⁶ provides that an agent is a person who does any one or more of a list of enumerated acts for the company. For instance, if a man solicits insurance on behalf of a company, he is its agent. In agreement with this provision the Texas policy omits the New York clause, which reads: "In any matter relating to this insurance, no person, unless duly authorized in writing, shall be deemed the agent of this company." The fact of agency and not the existence of a piece of writing is the test of agency.

(6). *The interest of the mortgagee is protected in the main contract.* If a property owner borrows \$5,000 on a mortgage, one way⁷ to secure the lender is to insert the lender's name in the blank of a clause of the standard policy, which reads: "It is agreed that any loss or damage ascertained and proved to be due to the assured under this policy shall be held payable to . . . as interest may appear, subject, however, to all the terms and conditions of this policy." If a loss of \$8,000 occurs, a payment of \$5,000 is made to the lender in satisfaction of the debt, which is cancelled. But if the insured has violated the policy, it may happen that the insurer is free from liability under the New York form. A Texas law protects the lender, who will receive his \$5,000 even if the owner gets nothing. This statute provides that the interest of a mortgagee shall not be invalidated by an act of neglect of the owner, or the happening of any condition beyond his control.⁸

(7). *Coinurance clauses are prohibited with certain exceptions.* Coinurance clauses vary in character. The insured may be required to bear a part of the loss, *e.g.*, one-fourth. He may be required to carry insurance equal to

⁶*Revised Civil Statutes of Texas*, 1925, Article 5056.

⁷Another method is to attach a standard mortgagee clause which is devised to safeguard the interests of both the insurance company and the lender.

⁸*Ibid.*, Article 4931.

a certain specified percentage of the value of the property with the understanding that if he fail to do so he can collect payment for only that part of the loss equal to the ratio which the insurance actually carried bears to what he should have carried. In any case the indemnity cannot exceed the face of the policy. If the value of property is \$10,000 and the clause calls for 80 per cent or \$8,000 insurance, and only \$4,000 insurance is carried, the insured can collect only one-half of any loss and in no case over \$4,000. Such clauses are prohibited by Texas law;⁹ but exceptions are made for policies on cotton, grain, or other products in process of marketing, shipping, storing, or manufacture. If an insurance company can require a large amount of insurance in proportion to value, it can charge a lower rate. A coinsurance clause with lower rate is an advantage to a man who wants to be well insured. The clause operates to the disadvantage of a man who greatly underinsures. Such a man should pay a higher rate and keep the clause off his policy. The agent of the insurance company should see to it that every man who has a coinsurance clause on his policy knows that it is there and what it means.

NOTE.—Four of the above modifications (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7) have caused much controversy. The reader who is interested is referred to standard works on insurance for discussion of the principles involved.

⁹*Revised Civil Statutes of Texas*, 1925, Article 4891.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY B. F. WRIGHT, JR.

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SMALL, ALBION W. *Origins of Sociology*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. viii, 358.)

Professor Small's far-flung structure of *Origins* is apt to be looked at askance by many sociologists. To them a history of Sociology should begin with an enumeration of those authors who seemed to approach more nearly the doctrinal form and content of modern Sociology. This manner of procedure is unsound. Suppose one finds in an author, obscure and practically unknown during his time and after, doctrines and interpretations similar to those which modern Sociology presents. Does such a scientific anachronism belong to the line of continuity which leads to modern Sociology? The probabilities are that a place will be found for this sociological black sheep in a history of Sociology. And yet how utterly meaningless is such a procedure. A history of Sociology is not a chronological *post mortem* of all those who have been found in later years to have held more or less sound sociological opinions. A history of a science is an account of the manner in which the working concepts of that science have been formed across the ages. It may turn out that authors working in fields miles away from the field of Sociology, with no interest in it and maybe even hostile to it, have done more to fashion its system of concepts than many who have been directly connected with it. This is, of course, particularly true in the early stage of a science when the fields have not been delimited and when its adepts are blindly struggling for a technique. All this is true even leaving out the assumption that no science can be fully understood in its development unless one takes cognizance of the contiguous fields. The physical sciences have reached a point where a line of continuity can be shown in chemistry, i.e., without constant reference to mathematics and physics. Such a reference will help greatly in understanding the evolution of chemistry, but it is not as indispensable as it is in an account of chemistry before Mendeleef.

In the case of the Social Sciences to this day a line of continuity limited to the special concepts of each Social Science ends in a fantastic and arbitrary reconstruction. Political Science today cannot be understood at all without a knowledge of the work done in certain fields of economics. In Sociology the situation is just as dependent. In its origins the matter is even more complicated, and this Professor Small has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt.

The sort of a thing which is accepted grudgingly and grudgingly as Sociology is stated by Professor Small as follows:

"There are manifestations of energy which have their impulse at one end and their impact at the other in people. These manifestations make up a cosmos of interpersonal relations. It extends over and through all the time and space which ever have been and ever will be occupied by human beings. Wherever two or more human beings are together givings and takings of influences occur between them. The involutions of these reciprocities of influence are the processes of the interpersonal cosmos. In and through these interchanges human facts have their most credible values. The realm of these relations is just as real as the physical cosmos. In its aspect as a correlation of processes of personal influence it challenges investigation just as literally as the movements of the heavenly bodies provoke astronomers' inquiries. There can be no such thing as Social Science worthy of the name until interpretation of human affairs includes and assimilates, among other things, the completest possible investigation of this interpersonal cosmos. Incidental to the required investigation, an account of all discoverable modes of interpersonal influence is demanded, with formulation of the involved relations of cause and effect.

"The sociologists began to grow articulate in attempting to express their feeble grasp of these facts in terms of 'society.' Our latest conceptions of the outstanding facts and problems voice themselves in terms of 'group processes.'" (Pp. 346-347.)

Now it is plain enough that every effort at an understanding of human behavior in groups has been struggling blindly to understand just this "interpersonal cosmos." But it did not know it and could not know it. What it knew is that there was a special problem which needed clearing up—often a practical problem—and this special and practical problem, when it was solved with the instruments at the disposal of the searchers of the time, brought us a little nearer to an understanding of the whole interpersonal cosmos. A history of Sociology would, according to this, have to begin with and state all the factors which have entered into the making of every generalization or the establishing of every fact ultimately influential in the construction of the Sociological doctrinal edifice. Theoretically this is true, but it is also true, theoretically, that a good many of these influences can be taken for granted, a good many are the common property of all human thought on social experience; and finally, not all of them are of equal importance in showing the continuity. Among those of supreme importance Professor Small has selected the following: The Thibaut-Savigny controversy; Eichhorn and the multiplicity of Factors; Niebuhr and scrutiny of evidence; Ranke and documentation; collection and use of archives; present historical methodology; approaches to objective economic and political science

in Germany; Cameralism; the period of retarded development in German Social Science; the transition to systematic political economy in Germany; the attempt to reconstruct classical economic theory on the basis of comparative economic history (1850); the attempts (about 1870) to reconstruct economic theory by appeal to psychology; the reappearance of the ethical factor in German economic theory; later phases of the conflict between the historical and the Austrian schools; the restoration of ethics in economic theory; the professorial socialists; the Verein für Socialpolitik; the Schmoller-Treitschke controversy, illustrating the psychology of transition; the attempt (1860-80) to reconstruct economic theory on a sociological basis; the sociologizing movement within political science (1850-60).

The contention which emerges from this enumeration and analysis of influence in such foreign fields is that within these fields the experimentators were laying the foundation for the new sociological approach. Out of Niebuhr's and Ranke's effort at a carefully scrutinized and weighted evidence there grew an objectivity in the Social Sciences. Out of Savigny and Eichhorn there came a realization of the working of multitudes of unperceived factors, which a later technique would deprive of the mysticism clinging to them in the minds of their discoverers. Out of Cameralism and the Historical School of Economics there came the need of considering the "organism as a whole" even though the conception as to what that organism was might later be proven to have been faulty. This faultiness itself will be discovered by the emergence of the ethical factor in economics on the one hand, the exaggerations of the individualistic analysis of the marginalists on the other. In a word, social scientists once subjected to the sort of influence implied in these disciplines could not remain in the position of satisfied acquiescence. They had to go on, and the road inevitably led to that feeling of restlessness and dissatisfaction with existing explanations resulting in the creation of another set of explanations which ended in a Sociology.

Now there may be other influences of equal importance. Professor Small does not deny that. He has selected the above succession of factors because "the links in the chain of this experience are more easily traced" than the links in the chain of any other experience familiar to him.

Now it is possible that hosts of sociologists, particularly of the younger generation, would stand quite bewildered and estranged before such a family of ancestors. Some of them would prefer to claim their kinship through anthropology and eugenics, others would prefer to think of themselves as the descendants of Comte, others still would be happier to live in the shadow of practical Sociology and Christian charity. And it is not necessary to deny the claims of any of these influences. What we need is for others to work out *their* lines of continuity in the manner in which Professor Small

has worked out his. The upshot of the matter will then be not a case of settling between rival claims, but an evaluation of the influence of each of these little rivers which have finally wound their way to a safe resting place into the consistent system of generalizations ultimately making up the science of Sociology.

MAX SYLVIVS HANDMAN.

University of Texas.

LASKI, HAROLD J. *A Grammar of Politics*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. Pp. 672.)

If by a "grammar" of politics is meant a treatise on the elements of the science of politics, this book is misnamed. It is in comprehensiveness rather than in factual objectivity that such a title is justified. Mr. Laski has at least as ambitious a project as had Aristotle, but much less the point of view of the compiler. Essentially it is a theory of the political *ought* rather than of the political *is*; not that it is a mere utopian dream, but that it is the author's picture of the most desirable way to direct and modify existing institutions. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with principles, the second with institutions.

Mr. Laski's belief that the all-sovereign State is no longer a tenable, much less a sufficient theory, from the viewpoint either of realities or oughts, is the point of departure in the present work as it was the thesis of his earlier works. So much so, indeed, that the first chapter, "The Purpose of Social Organization," deals with that subject to a greater extent than with the scheduled one, and the second chapter, "Sovereignty," contains numerous things which, in view of his opposition to that theory, properly belong under other headings. As far as concerns the problem of sovereignty, his argument may be summarized as follows: This theory originated and has been re-expressed in time of crisis, in time of the need for a powerful State. At the present such conditions do not exist and the State has come to be but one of the agencies to which men give allegiance and which is devoted to securing the good life. It is admitted that in the last resort the State can enforce its acts on all within its limits, but asserted that no realistic view of politics can rest content upon such a legalistic hypothesis. The acts of the State are really but the acts of persons to whom power is delegated, and the rightness of such acts is not to be postulated but to be questioned. It is the functioning of such acts, not their source, which entitles them to obedience and respect. In short, he insists that political theory should be a theory of political institutions, not of the State, a theory of the workings of Government, not of the general will, and the consent of the governed must be a continual reality, not a metaphysical presupposition. A democracy, if it is to be workable, must

be an aristocracy by delegation, but an aristocracy constantly subject to criticism and removal.

In the following chapters we find the expression of what are, at least at the present time in the United States, extreme theories of the rights of all people. Mr. Laski is not content to deal with legal rights alone, but is concerned to a very great degree with moral rights as well. They are natural rights in the sense of being essential to a full life and functional in the sense of being obligations as well as privileges. He is concerned more with the rights that need recognition than those now receiving legal sanction. And the basis of such rights appears to be what Mr. Justice Holmes has termed "that equality of position in which liberty begins." He prefers to discuss them in the concrete rather than in the general or abstract. They include the right to work for an adequate wage and to reasonable hours of labor, to such education as will fit the individual for responsible citizenship, to the franchise, and to the expression of any opinion—in war as well as in peace. The right to property should be a limited one—one that is based upon the function served and the power exercised by the owner. His definition of liberty follows from such premises: "the eager maintenance of that atmosphere in which men have the opportunity to be their best selves." This atmosphere is to be had only if men are given approximately equal opportunities so far as their abilities enable them to take advantage of them. It is contended not so much that legislation can make men free and equal as that unless certain changes are made it will keep them unfree and unequal. The attempt involves again the investigation of the services performed by property and industrial organization, and payment only for those services found to be valuable to society.

As he opposes the theory that internal sovereignty is unlimited, so does he attack the theory of the all-powerful nation State. Events of the past century show that the consequences of the sovereign right of self-determination are not those envisaged by Mazzini and Mill, for the politics of prestige and of aggrandizement are soon encountered.

The final chapter in Part I is entitled "Authority as Federal." Here we find the author coming back to his general point that his theory of politics has as its center of interest not the ultimate source of legal reference in society but the relations established by political authority in order to make decisions the result of the largest empirical induction it is possible to obtain. The emphasis is again upon the constant consent of the governed. "It is clear, first of all, that the experience of each member of the State, both by himself and in concert with others, must be made capable of expression." He finds that it is not worth while to deny the truth of the statement that such a theory involves the thesis "that the exercise of authority is surrounded by a penumbra of anarchy." Unity is not in the

State until it is made, and it must always be in a process of remaking through the association of interests. Government must be so organized as to represent all interests, but Mr. Laski believes that this does not involve the discarding of the territorial basis of politics.

Part II includes chapters on political, economic, judicial, and international institutions. A brief summary can only suggest the general nature of the argument here; it cannot even indicate the thoroughness with which Mr. Laski goes into some of the problems involved, that, for example, of the place of committees in administration. It must suffice here to say that the political and judicial institutions favored are in the main those already established in England, with the notable exceptions of a written constitution rather easily amendable, a unicameral legislature, and a director of defense as well as of prosecution. The old basis of representation is preferred to the proportional representation, and, in the case of a Federal State, judicial interpretation of the Constitution is proposed. It is in the field of economic life and institutions that really striking changes are advocated, changes which are in the main those favored by the English Labour Party. In order the better to secure the rights of the labourer and to further the interests of society, there is needed a very considerable increase in public control and ownership of industry. As in political so in economic institutions there should be opportunities for Federal government and for freedom of discussion of the problems of organization and control. Relatively severe limitation of inheritances is also proposed. However, such changes are not to be made overnight; it is believed that they will not only be more acceptable but more effective if they develop gradually. In the international field the program calls for an extension of such existing institutions as the League of Nations and the international economic and judicial organizations. Again it is urged that the sovereign national State has served its purpose and is in process of disappearance.

A book with so ambitious a purpose deserves careful and extended discussion. That being impossible here, the reviewer must be content to touch upon but one or two aspects of it.

The question of style, of minor details of composition and of organization would seem to be one which might better be left out of such a brief review, but Mr. Laski almost forces one to comment. He writes brilliantly, but frequently too brilliantly. The flashy show of learning so distasteful to many of the readers of the earlier books is less noticeable, but there is still present much of the lack of brevity, of simplicity, of clarity and of nicety of organization within chapters and within paragraphs. The over-use of a few uncommon words, such as "penumbra," and a few careless misquotations, that from the tenth *Federalist*, for example, are only less irritating than the diffuseness which forces one to wade through

two or three pages where one would have been better. That is, will force one to wade through if one believes them to be worth the time and effort required. The present reviewer has no hesitancy in saying that he finds it to be worth the expenditure. Mr. Laski is one of the small group of contemporary political theorists who has something worth saying; he has a point of view and is not at all backward about expressing it. In a time that is seemingly afraid of adventuring with ideas and prefers the cosy domesticity of compilation one may well be all the more grateful for a handful of exceptions, for a few works on the theory of politics in which the author really has opinions to express. A passion for statistics is highly commendable, but it can never produce important political ideas. Minute and non-interpretive analysis forms an essential basis for all sound theory, but imagination and rationalization are equally necessary. In the study of politics there is no place for that form of the ancient error of the dichotomy of judgment in which all statements are held to be either fact or impractical theory and judged accordingly. The significance of Plato, of Locke, of Montesquieu and of Rousseau in the shaping of the modern State cannot be dismissed so lightly. Their work may be "political literature" rather than political science, but they did manage, somehow, to be vastly important, and what is almost as much to the point for some of us, their books make profoundly satisfying reading. Mr. Laski's latest work at least represents certain tendencies and certain reactions which are not lightly to be dismissed by students of the contemporary political scene.

So far as concerns the central theory of the book, the reviewer has little to question. One may, as Mr. Laski does, agree that the concept of sovereignty is valuable to law or metaphysics and yet insist that dealing in absolutes is no proper basis for a theory of politics. This is not a neatly logical view, but it does have the merit of permitting emphasis to be placed upon a more fruitful method of approach; it makes possible a shift from questions of power to those of the merits and demerits of the Government's work. The author makes out a stronger case for his theory of political authority than in his earlier books, and partly because he is coming to see that the pluralistic or federalistic aspect of that theory has been receiving a disproportionate amount of emphasis by him, as it has been singled out for attack by nearly all of his critics. After all, it is but one and possibly not the most important phase of the weakness of the absolutist theory of sovereignty.

The theory of rights and liberties set forth and the plan of institutions to be based upon such principles challenges attention. It is neither to criticize nor to commend the author to say that they consist in large part of rationalizations of the British political system, the Labour Party platform and the League of Nations-World

Court program. These may or may not be valid starting or concluding points; the merits of each proposal must be tested for itself and in its relation to the others proposed. Perhaps the most difficult and yet most important of all the problems involved in the establishment of such a system is hardly mentioned—the possibility of such a huge and complicated economic, social and political organization being made workable in so democratic a society. Arguments that all interests should be represented in political and economic organizations are not complete until it is demonstrated that those who are to be represented are aware of their interests and willing and able to speak for them. They do have interests which should be represented, but our own experience certainly does not prove that democratic institutions always or even normally produce such a result. Anything like a solution of this problem would seem to involve an investigation of public opinion along the lines Mr. Lippmann has suggested, an investigation more searching than even that author has yet undertaken. Mr. Laski is evidently an optimist about the capacity of democratically organized society; we should like to know more about the reasons for his optimism.

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University of Texas.

HENDERSON, GERARD C. *The Federal Trade Commission*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. Pp. xiii, 382.)

At a time when certain leaders in political circles are clamoring for the abolition of the Federal Trade Commission, a critical analysis of that body's origin and work is peculiarly appropriate. *The Federal Trade Commission*, the first of a series of intensive studies in administrative law and practice under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund, provides a brief yet reliable and readable exposition of the subject not only for the lawyer but for the economist and business man as well. Intensive rather than comprehensive in its nature, Mr. Henderson's work is limited primarily to a study of the "permanent duties of the Commission in administering Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and Sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act." This limitation, however, deals no injustice to the Commission, for that body was originated solely to carry out the ideas set forth in these legal provisions; its other activities have been in the nature of addenda, useful, perhaps, but occupying a minor position.

Mr. Henderson devotes the opening pages of his work to an account of the growth and fruition of the idea which resulted in the creation of the Federal Trade Commission. Having shown us the purposes motivating the originators of this new Federal agency, the author exhibits to us, detail by detail, the machinery whereby this

agency functions. To set the machinery in motion there must be, first, the receipt of a complaint; then, investigation of the complaint, and, finally, its consideration by a board of review. These are only the preliminary proceedings. Having disposed of this curtain-raiser, Mr. Henderson guides us along the lengthy route pursued in a formal proceeding. At the beginning we see the Commission issuing a complaint against the presumed offender. At the end of the trail we see this same body setting forth its judgment in a "findings of fact." To the casual reader, the author's dissection of the procedure may seem over-meticulous, but no apologies are needed in view of the light this careful dissection later throws on the seeming inadequacy of many of the Commission's findings.

As might be expected, a critical survey of the Commission's published decisions, particularly that portion of the decision known as the "findings of fact," follows the analysis of procedure. The value of the Commission's "findings of fact" rests in the clarity with which it presents to the business world, presumably in need of enlightenment, an actual example of a practice condemned or sanctioned by the Commission. Mr. Henderson thinks such clarity is too often sacrificed through the ambiguity and formality of legal phraseology in which the Commission clothes its findings.

Most fair-minded business men would probably admit that deceptive and dishonest practices necessitate governmental regulation. But where lies the dividing line between dishonesty and business acumen? By what means is the fairness or honesty of a practice to be determined? Furthermore, among deceptive and dishonest practices which come within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, and which within the jurisdiction of State agencies and Federal agencies other than the Commission? Mr. Henderson shows how the Commission in endeavoring to answer these questions has endangered its reputation as a guardian of "good" business men, and "has encroached upon fields already well occupied by other tribunals or administrative agencies."

In the final chapter of his work concerning the Commission's various fields of effort, Mr. Henderson considers that body's experiences in endeavoring to check "practices which restrain trade." He finds that "defective draftsmanship of the law," nullification of its orders by the courts, and inconsistencies in its own policy, have rendered the Commission's attempts in this field practically futile.

In a brief concluding chapter of clear and constructive criticisms, Mr. Henderson recommends a change in the method of serving complaints, an abandonment of the legal and formal phraseology now obscuring the published decisions, and "a greater discretion in selecting those cases which involve questions of public importance."

If there is one possible ground for criticism of this work, it is

in the insufficiency of the base on which the author rests his interpretations of the findings of fact. Hampered, through no fault of his own, by a lack of complete knowledge as to the testimony lying back of such findings, Mr. Henderson was forced to base his observations on a study of summarized statements of cases. That Mr. Henderson was aware of this weakness is evidenced by his constant iteration to the effect that he was unable to burrow through the voluminous testimony accompanying each case. This, doubtless, would have required a corps of assistants and several years of investigation.

In his critical analysis of the Commission's procedure and the tangible results of its efforts, the author is on more substantial ground. To those who are adherents of the Federal Trade Commission it is cheering to note that Mr. Henderson in his final recommendations proves himself a constructive critic and at heart a believer in the mission of this regulator of "big business."

Altogether, delving into the Federal Trade Commission's records must have been a tedious task for Mr. Henderson, but he seems to have made a very good job of it.

RODEN FULLER.

REQUA, MARK L. *The Relation of Government to Industry*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Pp. 241.)

The author is fortunate in having an unusually rich field of experience from which he is able to develop thoughts and conclusions that should prove to be of particular interest and value to the student of this subject of the relationship of Government and industry. He has passed through a course of training as mining engineer, farmer, railway executive, consulting engineer and public official in various capacities. From such a favored position to make one's observations, the author should be able to supply an additional element of soundness to his conclusions.

The author disclaims any attempt at making a comprehensive analysis of the relationship subsisting between Government and business, or at formulating any policy which the Government should adopt toward business and industry. The reader cannot be long in discovering that the purpose of the book is not to furnish any analysis of the situation as it actually is, but rather to stimulate interest and encourage study and investigation in the subject.

In a chapter on "Paternalism, Communism, and Individualism," the author contends that much governmental interference with private business, either in the way of aid or for the purpose of directing or controlling the use of private property has always proved detrimental to the people. Wartime operation of railroads, the author believes, furnishes a good illustration of what may be expected whenever the

Government attempts to direct or operate a business or industry. The institution of private property cannot be too jealously guarded. If there is to be an adequate production of economic goods, the individual must be left as free as possible and be permitted to reap the fruits of his own labors, the proper function of the Government being merely that of extending aid to and exercising supervision over private effort. The Government cannot go much further than to lend its coöperation where conflicts arise as between agriculture and industry and between labor and capital. The Government must, however, have the right to interfere wherever it is necessary to prevent waste of our natural resources.

In discussing present-day conditions in the United States, the author expresses the opinion that the relationship between Government and consolidated industry has not yet been worked out satisfactorily; that most of the legislation so far enacted has been "blundering, unsound, and unfitted to the needs of the occasion." He touches on some of the causes of present-day unrest, revealing itself in such outward expressions as "blocs" in our legislative bodies. The blocs reveal the most serious conditions of confusion, and constitute in themselves an additional source of confusion. This rise of blocs in Congress whose purpose is to secure special legislation for special classes runs counter to the very forces which underlie party government. Here is an instance of interference with business and industry which is sought from the Government in absolute disregard of economic principles.

The author condemns specifically the fatuous purposes of the present agricultural blocs in Congress. It may be presumed that he is willing to include within his judgment of condemnation the industrial blocs with which Congress has been infested during the greater part of its period of existence, and whose success in obtaining special legislation for the manufacturer injected early into our economic organism the virus of protection which laid the foundation for most of the ills of which the author complains.

The author is of the opinion that Congress has not, up to the present, shown the ability and the high-minded devotion to service that must be reached before it can be trusted with the control of our industries. The inertia which Congress exhibited during the World War should be sufficient to convince everybody of the impracticability of nationalizing business and industry too widely. Neither has the public advanced sufficiently far toward an understanding of the problems surrounding the question of social service, nor have our legislative bodies shown that they possess the proper conception and intelligent understanding of this question of the relationship of business and industry to Government to warrant the creation of a closer relationship of Government and the private affairs of the individual. A plea is made for a nation-wide training in citizenship,

the author advocating compulsory instruction in the elements of Government in all preparatory schools as well as in our universities. The general absence of such special preparation of our youth for the duties of citizenship is primarily responsible for the abysmal ignorance of our citizens surrounding this question of the proper relationship of Government and private property. To this conclusion every thoughtful person must surely agree.

The author makes no attempt at describing the actual policies which the Government has adopted toward industry. Such a study would necessarily involve a delineation of the course which the constitutional provisions relating to private property have taken, and an account of the career of such famous pieces of legislation as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, the Clayton Act, the Transportation Act of 1920 and the various tariff laws. Neither does the author attempt to explain the extent to which the National Government may go in the regulation of private affairs in the exercise of its police powers. As such a presentation of the subject would necessarily have involved an immense amount of painstaking labor and much time, it would perhaps be a most uncharitable act to expect more from a busy man of affairs as the author must be.

The book is less informative and instructive than it is thought-provoking. It cannot fail to leave impressions with the reader that should provoke more serious thinking upon this important subject.

If this was the author's purpose, he has without doubt succeeded.

S. W. SWENSON.

University of Oklahoma.

DE BUSTAMANTE, ANTONIO S. *The World Court*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Pp. xxv, 379.)

This is an opportune moment for a clear and scholarly volume on the Permanent Court of International Justice to appear in the United States. There seems to be a slight recrudescence of interest in international affairs. It may be the question of international debts; it may be the complications of world trade; it may be the adjustment of former high ideals to practical world affairs; it may be the natural corollary of a forward imperialistic policy. Whatever the cause is, and no matter how slight the renewed interest may be, it is hoped that the despair of the days following the Peace of Paris may not be repeated. A clear understanding of world affairs and of the agencies which endeavor to create and maintain world peace and amity is essential if that despair is to be avoided. The recent enthusiasm displayed by important groups of people in the country over the World Court can be fostered and made perpetual, perhaps, upon a basis of sound understanding both of possibilities and limitations. That alone will produce permanent results. Any effort

which contributes to such an understanding is both welcome and of immense value.

Dr. de Bustamante is a man who is well fitted to make clear the history and nature of the World Court. He is a jurisconsult of worldwide reputation. For several years he has been professor of international law in the University of Havana. Added to that he is vice-president of the Institute of International Law, member of the American Institute of International Law, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and was elected one of the first judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Although he is an American and understands both North and South America, he has an especially clear grasp of European affairs in their relation to the New World.

The merits of the work become quite clear after even a hasty examination. The author's style is simple and direct and is possessed of vigor. The treatment is scholarly and the analyses are carefully worked out. But as to treatment the author has done two splendid things. The history of the world court movement is briefly and skillfully traced. This insures a proper historical perspective. Then finally the present Permanent Court of International Justice is explained in all its aspects. This includes not only foundation and organization but also jurisdiction, financial basis and work accomplished. On the whole, the book is authoritative and will be of value to the scholar and of interest to the average citizen.

The historical background for the present World Court is of unusual interest. Ideas of a world court are of great age. Since such ideas were first expressed there have been numerous concrete proposals which have increased in numbers in recent times. These were often vague and universally premature, but they were beginnings. In more recent times The Hague Peace Conferences made their contribution, and in Central America a Court of Justice was actually established in 1907. The steps taken at the Paris Conference for the creation of a World Court under the aegis of the League of Nations were only natural, the result of a long period of growth and development. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the establishment of a world court. In accord with this provision an advisory committee of jurists was appointed. This distinguished committee framed the statute which provides for the court and its work. The court had its first meeting in January, 1922, at The Hague.

The method used for the selection of judges was suggested by Elihu Root and James Brown Scott. It overcomes many of the difficulties which are usually raised, and in actual operation a group of very brilliant men were chosen without friction. The rules for the organization and operation of the court were framed by the judges themselves. They worked on the understanding that the court is one of justice and not one of arbitration. The rules which

have been devised are not complete, but they are the basis upon which the court has begun its work. The expenses of the court are paid by the members of the League of Nations. There are some anomalies in this financial relationship, but up to this time no evil results have been experienced.

The jurisdiction of the court is a point of great difficulty. Under conditions outlined it exercises jurisdiction over both persons and things. In a large number of cases States have determined by treaties between themselves what the jurisdiction of the court shall be. In like manner there are treaties which provide for the enforcement of the court's decisions. These, however, are not complete and much depends upon the moral position of the court and the authority which it exercises by virtue of its position and achievements.

The work of the court has been important, although not of great extent. Advisory opinions have been given and cases have been settled. In all there have been eleven advisory opinions. As to whether these would bind the future action of the court or tend ultimately to subvert justice, are questions which have not yet been determined. One important fact remains. These opinions have, without exception, been accepted in good faith and have shaped the action of the States which requested them. The actual cases decided have been few in number and of no outstanding importance. In handing down these decisions the court has established itself and has worked with great dignity and force. The author expressed the fervent hope "that its future action will justify these past triumphs, and will lend stability and security to its high mission of peace and justice."

In his concluding chapter the author reviews briefly the present position of the United States in relation to the court. In doing this he is merely expressing a hope that the United States may participate in the institution. This brings one back to the introductory word written for the volume by Edward W. Bok. He, too, believes that this Government can do nothing less than assist in making the court a success. The work, then, is an appeal to the American people. It is written in an excellent temper and with a fine restraint. It hopes to influence intellectual and thinking people and to obtain their active support for this great international undertaking.

JOSEPH D. DOTY.

Southern Methodist University.

MAVOR, JAMES. *An Economic History of Russia*. 2 vols. (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1925. Pp. 614, 630.)

These two weighty volumes are a reissue in revised and enlarged form of a work first published in 1914. In the first volume Professor

Mavor deals with the period prior to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. An adequate sketch is given of the early history, but the bulk of the attention is given to the period after the accession of Peter the Great to the throne in 1682. The second volume deals with the period of 1861-1905. One chapter has been added to deal with certain aspects of the revolution, but no attempt was made to bring the work down to date. That task is reserved for a third and supplemental volume. As this is now the standard English work upon the subject, extended notice is not desirable. Professor Mavor, out of his wide knowledge of Russian sources, has made available a great store of material previously unavailable. It will probably be many years before as thorough a study can be made again. And certainly within the fields which he made especially his own—the rise and fall of bondage right and the revolutionary movements—his work will stand unchallenged.

As Professor Mavor is now dead, one of his former students may, perhaps, be pardoned if he add here a personal tribute. It was impossible to sit under him without marveling at the range of his interests and the extent of his information, and without being charmed by his classroom manner. He possessed an unusual fund of knowledge, yet he was never overcome by it. His interest lay in the interplay of causes, not in the presentation of a lifeless chronology of brute acts. The broad sweep of historical forces, the interrelation of economics with political and scientific thought, these he presented with telling force. One will never forget his classes, the patriarchal white beard framing a face of infinite kindness, the massive brow overhanging the sparkling blue eyes, the brilliance of his mind, and the soft, clear, Scots voice—all combined to make his lectures a constant delight.

His teaching and his research could take only a small part of his abounding energy. Before coming to Canada, he had been for a time editor of the *Scottish Art Review*. He never lost his interest in that field. He was one of the first to recognize and to encourage the efforts which have since come to fruition in the newer Canadian School of Painting. He traveled extensively, not only in Western Europe, but also through Russia, Siberia, and the Far East. He had an unusual capacity for friendship, and few men were more worth knowing. The range of his interests is well shown by the diversity of his friendships: Tolstoi and Kropotkin, Lord Bryce, Lord Kelvin, Goldwin Smith, C. W. Barron of the *Wall Street Journal*, and Sir William Van Horne of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Mystics, revolutionaries, scientists, politicians, active men of affairs, all seemed to seek him out. As a conversationalist he had an international reputation. For many Europeans traveling in America his home in Toronto was the one place west of New York which they felt they could not miss. Nor was he lacking in practical judgment.

At different times he prepared reports upon Canada for the British Government, upon immigration for the Canadian Government, and for the Canadian Pacific Railway. In each case they were made the basis for large expenditures, but he would never accept payment for them, for as a professor he was a public servant. *La noblesse oblige*.

I saw him in September last on my way through Toronto. His fact was whiter than I cared to see. I was told that he had overworked in preparing his book on the Russian revolution and had suffered severely from a heart attack. But he still talked with his old vivacity. Shortly after, he left for England to visit friends. From thence he intended to go through Spain and Italy to observe the counter-revolutions there, coming finally to Grenoble, France, where he wished to spend the winter with his old friend, Patrick Geddes of town-planning fame. It was not to be. He died peacefully in his sleep in Glasgow at the home of his sister, alert, vigorous, interested to the end.

JOHN LORNE MCDUGALL.

University of Texas.

CALDWELL, ROBERT GRANVILLE. *A Short History of the American People*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1925. Vol. I, Pp. x, 520.)

There has been a demand for some time for a two volume survey of the history of the United States. As the complexity of history and historical writing increases it is more and more difficult to write a brief history covering the main movements of American History as was possible a generation ago. Particularly since the emergence of the United States from the isolation of the nineteenth century to a position of world importance in the twentieth more emphasis will be placed on recent or contemporary history. Professor Caldwell has attempted to meet the demand for a two-volume survey, and also the demand for a greater emphasis on the period of American history since the Civil War.

The first volume of Professor Caldwell's work covers the period from the discovery of the New World to the threshold of the Civil War. There might be differences of opinion as to whether 1860 is the proper point of division for a work of this kind, and this review finds it difficult to pass judgment on the plan of the whole work when only half of it is finished. For a year course in American history it probably makes little difference where the first volume ends and the second begins, but for a half-year course in which only one volume would be used, it occurs to this writer that the Civil War should be included to round out the first volume, or that the background and causes should be included in the second volume to make it complete.

The plan of the whole work must be judged, however, when the whole work is complete.

The volume under discussion shows a careful study of sources and a knowledge and use of recent scholarship in American history. The author has maintained an attitude of detachment and has treated controversial questions objectively and in accordance with the sources. The style on the whole is good, but occasionally the author falls into an emotional style, which might appeal to the college sophomore but would hardly strengthen the book. The chronological method of treatment is used for the most part, but a good balance is maintained between the topics and their chronology.

The first chapter deals with the period of discovery, including the background for the voyages of discovery, a brief discussion of the explorations during the early period, and a synopsis of the process by which the whole continent was opened to the knowledge of Europe.

The next three chapters deal with colonization, the foundations, the development of British imperialism and colonial life and institutions. The next general topic has to do with the American Revolution to which four chapters are devoted. One chapter is devoted to the making of the Constitution, one to the establishment of the National Government and the National Constitution, one to Jeffersonian democracy, one to the contest for neutral rights or the War of 1812, one to the transition and the nationalism following the War of 1812. From Jackson on the chapters are devoted to Jackson's policies, the annexation of Texas, the advance to the Pacific, a general survey with regard to social life about 1850 and the last two chapters are devoted to the background for the Civil War. The volume contains nineteen good maps and tables and a fair index, but practically no bibliography at all. There is no classified bibliography, the only suggestions to authorities being brief statements at the end of the chapter, which is entirely inadequate. It is hoped that in a second volume Professor Caldwell will supply a good workable bibliography which is so essential to a usable textbook at the present time.

A. K. CHRISTIAN.

University of Oklahoma.

LONG, BRACKENRIDGE. *The Genesis of the Constitution of the United States of America.* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1926. Pp. 260.)

This work is an analytic study of the documents relating to the problem of government in the colonies, extending through the period of the revolution and confederation and closing with the call of the Federal Convention of 1787. The charters of the colonies, the early State constitutions, the proposals for union by individuals as well as conventions and congresses are studied with a view of showing

that the essential features of our present Constitution, such as the bicameral system, three departments of Government, checks and balances, the veto, judicial review, territorial representation, short terms of office, our federalism, and constitutional convention were constantly in the making from the Mayflower Compact to 1787.

In this respect there is no contribution made by this publication, the material used is about the same as found in Frothingham's *Rise of the Republic*.

This formal side of the work, however, is supported by a statement of the economic, social, and political conditions in England and the colonies that gave birth to the documents used. The author seems clearly to have realized that economics lies back of the formal and legal character of political institutions. While there is also nothing new in this conception of politics, the combination of the basic and the formal is not found in any other publication of this particular material, and this feature is its real value.

Speaking more critically, I should say the author's enthusiasm leads him to overemphasize the democratic character of our early political institutions and really to misrepresent the intentions of the forefathers. One would be logically driven to the conclusion, if he followed the author, that there was a continuous effort being made from 1620 to 1787 to establish a pure democracy in the colonies.

There are some typographical errors such as the Stamp Act Congress of 1865 for 1765 (p. 132), and the United States Constitutional Convention of 1781 for 1787 (p. 167). There are also errors of fact. On page 138 the author speaks of the Colonial Office of today, referring to the English Government. The colonial office in 1925 was changed to the office of the Dominions. The Secretary of State for the colonies is now known as the Secretary of State for the Dominions. On page 144 he speaks of a Dickinson of Pennsylvania and a Dickinson of Delaware. There was just one John Dickinson, who hailed alternately from Pennsylvania and Delaware.

C. P. PATTERSON.

University of Texas.

DUTCHER, GEORGE MATTHEW. *The Political Awakening of the East*. (The Abingdon Press, New York, 1925. Pp. 372.)

In arranging for the fifth course of lectures under the George Slocum Bennett Foundation at Wesleyan University the committee seized upon the opportunity to make available at that institution the first-hand investigations Professor Dutcher was then making in the social and political problems of the Orient. The result is the present volume, which includes not only the original lectures delivered in 1922-1923 but also such additions thereto as serve to bring them up to date.

Notwithstanding the title, the author considers many problems not strictly of a political nature. In each of the countries under review—Egypt, India, China, Japan, and the Philippines—he endeavors to present, first, a brief summary of historical facts, then a discussion, at greater length, of present social, economic, and political problems. The concluding chapter, "Problems of Progress," serves as a means for drawing conclusions, to compare, contrast, and generalize, as far as may be, conditions in the several countries in regard to such matters as labor, education, capital, industrialism, agriculture, and religion.

The author sees and describes clearly the new forces rising in the East. He distinguishes those forces from the general spirit of change and revolt now pervading, to a greater or less extent, all nations and all classes. What is going on in the East today is something vaster, more momentous, more potent, more significant. Carried to fruition, it would not merely change the center of gravity of control in given countries; of far greater moment to us of the Occident, it would tend to shift the center of gravity of world domination from the West to the East. Train Chinese, Japanese, and Indian labor as English, American, French and German labor is trained, and what would be the economic and political consequences?

The existing situation is well portrayed. The East is under the tutelage and control, more or less definite, of the West. But, whether one considers Egypt, or India, or China, or the Philippines, he sees the steady building up of a new order of things. New concepts, new ideas, new forms are taking root. A greater and greater proportion of the people, through education and other contacts with the West, is becoming articulate in society and in government. Industrialism is being introduced. Occidental civilization goes marching on. Yet, as it marches, it becomes ever more obvious that the East will not adopt it in order better to serve the West, but will adapt it to its own life and history and institutions in order the better to enable it to stand upon its own feet and face the West. It would thus appear that the West is training the teeming millions of the East, who, in turn, may dominate their former masters and teachers.

But that is, at worst, an event for the distant future. The immediate consequence of the revolution in the political, economic, and social ideas and institutions of the Orient will be the gradual ejection of Occidental countries from political control. That is obvious. One has but to consider Egypt, India, China, and the Philippines to see sufficient proof. That result, however, would be but a step, an evidence, of more fundamental changes yet to come.

These rising peoples have the good wishes of the author. Yet he would advise them to go slow, else chaos might result. For the English to get out of India or the Americans to leave the Philippines before the foundation is well laid for national unity and strength

would mean, in all likelihood, delay and even retrogression before the superstructure, to be built in accord with the genius and the ideals of the native civilizations, could be constructed.

It is not, however, Professor Dutcher's belief that a conflict between the West and the East is inevitable or even probable. The varied and difficult problems of labor, immigration, freedom of travel, extritoriality, and the like can be adjusted on a basis of good will, "with due reference to the maintenance of the original geographical distribution of races into separate units." Many, however, may wish to question the place he accords the Christian faith when he concludes that the "evidences of its vitality and power afford a reasonable hope that Christianity will be able to hold its own in furnishing the principles and affording the driving power of administration in whatever organic form the brotherhood of nations may take." Yet, considering the broad influence of Christian ethics, quite apart from mere creed and dogma, such a conclusion may not be without justification.

Finally, though one may differ with the author in this or that matter, it is easy to agree that he has treated his subject in a judicious, yet sympathetic, fashion. He presents, with due proportion and emphasis, the problems chosen for discussion. In the search for solutions he never loses sight of fundamental realities. The reader may, however, be conscious of the absence of an atmosphere of freshness, which travel and first-hand observation are supposed to contribute.

CHARLES A. TIMM.

University of Texas.

SELIGMAN, EDWIN R. A. *Studies in Public Finance*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. 302.)

This volume comprises twelve essays or studies on a variety of fiscal subjects. They deal with both theory and practice, and have all been previously published but in more or less inaccessible or inconvenient sources. With one exception they were written since 1913, and with this one exception, also, they deal with questions in which there is still a very lively interest.

The titles of the studies are: Comparative Tax Burdens in the Twentieth Century; the Allied Debts; Income Taxes and the Price Level; Taxation and Prices; Are Stock Dividends Income?; the Sales Tax; the Problem of Tax-Exempt Securities; Death Taxes, State or National?; the Taxation of Non-Residents in the New York Income Tax; Fiscal Reconstruction; the Reform of Municipal Taxation; the French Colonial Fiscal System. The first of these essays contains a summary account of the kinds of taxes employed and the changes therein in England, France, Germany, and the United States since 1900.

Professor Seligman's preëminence in the field of public finance

insures a welcome to the expression of his views on Government finance, and he has done a good service to the professional economist and to the general reader in presenting these studies in an accessible form. The volume is a worthy companion to his *Essays in Taxation*, and it heightens the expectancy of the appearance of his *Principles of Fiscal Science*.

E. T. MILLER.

University of Texas.

One result of the universal condition and atmosphere of change during the past decade or more is a vast number of books containing "impressions" of peoples, States, and the world in general. Just how much such works, being the product of a mass of notes gathered on a few months' rapid journey around the world, can contribute, is a debatable question. Yet, if they were all so delightfully written as *The Remaking of the Nations*, by J. Nicholson (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925, pp. xi, 276), more of them would be welcome. Traveling as an Albert Kahn fellow, the author spent a year visiting many of the countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, seeking to penetrate the life of East and of West and to fathom the true character of the process and effects of impacts of race upon race and culture upon culture. Everywhere he observed the universality of political, economic, and social change. Everywhere he saw the need of readjustment and the effort to find an intelligible ideal to serve as a basis for human society. In the course of his discussion he gives us intimate, sympathetic sketches of institutions, societies, movements, and individuals—all picked out with rare discrimination and treated with the sureness of touch that characterizes one who knows human life and human society. Thus, whether one is reading of groups of Fascisti singing praises of "liberty and discipline," of the ineffable beauty of the Taj Mahal, of the Asram of Tagore, or of the breath-taking speed of New York elevators, he may be sure that the observations, though hasty, were made by one who saw in them their larger meanings: social, political, and economic orders crumbling or growing, all changing, all being remade in the impact of one upon the other, whether East or West, whether Mohammedan, Hindu, Shinto, or Christian.

C. T.

One of the greatest needs of students interested in India and its problems is an unprejudiced, accurate, and thorough discussion of that country's economic, social, and political conditions. This need, in so far as economic problems are concerned, is well filled by P. Padmanabha Pillai in his *Economic Conditions in India* (E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925), which is the author's thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and is No. 78 in the series of monographs by writers of that school.

In such topics as "The Economic Evolution of India," "The Demand for Industries," "Agricultural Development," "Problems of Land and Labour," and "Large-Scale Production," Mr. Pillai searches not only for the fundamental factors of India's poverty but also seeks to discover ways to lift the Indian population out of economic misery. His conclusions are, in general, a defense of England's policies in India. He attacks the attitude of Indian politicians towards the "Drain" and favors industrialization. In short, he believes that although agriculture can and should be further developed, India must gradually become industrialized with first attention being given to small-scale industries; and that this industrialization will in large part continue to be dependent upon outside technical and financial aid until India's educational and financial systems are better developed. If he preaches any doctrine at all, it is that of self-help. It augurs well for India's future that Indian students are devoting themselves to scientific inquiry into India's problems instead of following this or that school of self-seeking politicians.

C. T.

The comment that must inevitably be made about Mr. Claude G. Bowers' *Jefferson and Hamilton* (Houghton Mifflin, 1925) is that it is delightfully readable. Indeed, it might much better have as its subtitle "History from the Point of View of Personages, Personalities, and Social Gossip" than the one he gives it, "The Struggle for Democracy in America." The work deals not with the development of political institutions or theory, except to a limited and rather superficial extent. Nor does it contain anything strikingly original in material or information, but it does contain many portraits of the great and the near-great who took part directly or indirectly in the struggles of the time. Adjectives are somewhat uncritically indulged in; the discussion of the reign of terror under the Alien and Sedition Acts is, to say the least, highly colored, and many of the other relatively unimportant but spectacular figures and incidents of the time receive much more attention than do the character or services of Washington or the significance of such political movements as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. But then if these and other men, for example, John Adams, whose importance as a thinker is not referred to and who is dismissed with a handful of adjectives, and institutional landmarks are passed by, the pen portraits of Jefferson and Hamilton are excellently done, and those of dozens of interesting characters—Mrs. Bingham, Lyon, Fisher, Ames, Mrs. Knox and her General, the Wolcotts, Butler, Gallatin, Giles, Madison, Mosley, Livingston, Pickering, to name some of them—are skillfully sketched in. In short, the author has done well what he set out to do.

Incidentally, the book is well documented, has a good bibliography and a useful index.

B. F. W.

The World of the Incas, by Otfrid von Hanstein (E. P. Dutton & Co., pp. 189), translated by Anna Barwell, is, in effect, an idealization of the Inca State. The political, economic, social, and military systems of that "socialistic state of the past" are sympathetically and interestingly described in the first four chapters. So enthusiastic does the author become over this State that he likens its principles to those expounded in Bellamy's *Looking Backwards*. The last four chapters of the book take up the story of the Spanish conquest. In striking fashion these chapters portray the desolation wrought upon a happy land and people by so-called civilized Christians, and mourn the death of a civilization that might have taught much to the world.

C. T.